

SMALL ARMS SURVEY

Special Report

Small Arms Availability,
Trade and Impacts
in the Republic of Congo

Spyros Demetriou
Robert Muggah
Ian Biddle

A study commissioned by
the International Organisation for
Migration and the United Nations
Development Programme

A publication of
the Small Arms Survey

Small Arms Availability, Trade and Impacts in the Republic of Congo

Spyros Demetriou
Robert Muggah
Ian Biddle

April 2002

A Study Prepared by the Small Arms Survey for
the International Organisation
for Migration and United Nations Development Programme

Table of Contents

Abbreviations	iii
Executive Summary	v
Introduction	1
Section 1. Background on the Militias and Conflicts in Congo	4
Section 2. Global Estimate of Militia Holdings	6
Acquisition of small arms and light weapons (1993–1999)	9
Weapons acquired from pre-1993 government holdings	9
Weapons procured from abroad, 1993–1997	11
Possession of small arms and light weapons, 1993–1999	13
Estimating militia size	14
Estimating average militia holdings	15
Section 3. Distribution of Militia Holdings, post-1999	17
General trends and patterns of weapons distribution	17
Militia-specific distribution patterns	18
Ex-combatants and weapons in Brazzaville	21
Ex-combatants and weapons in the region of Pool	25
Ex-combatants and weapons in Niari, Bouenza and Lekoumou	27
Section 4. Small Arms Proliferation and Trade in Republic of Congo	31
Cross-border trade in weapons	32
Internal trade and redistribution of weapons	33
Section 5. Measuring the Impacts of Small Arms in Congo-Brazzaville	36
A Question of health: Small arms injuries in Brazzaville	36
Northern exposure	37
Identifying victims	38
Rising or declining crime	38
Participatory rural appraisal (PRA) and insecurity	39
Small Arms Availability and Trade in Congo: Policy Implications	41
Global estimate of weapons holdings	41
The distribution of weapons	43
Small arms proliferation and trade	45
Impact of small arms on security conditions	46
Endnotes	47
Annexes	51
Annex 1: Research Matrix	51
Annex 2: Survey Questionnaire Administered to Ex-Combatants	52
Annex 3: Partial List of Government Weapons Depots	54
Annex 4: Weapons Acquired by Militias, 1993–1999	55
Annex 5: Weapons Collected by the CDS, 2000	56
Annex 6: Projections from Militia Size Estimates and Weapons Distribution	57
Annex 7: Distribution of Weapons According to the Survey of Ex-Combatants	58
Annex 8: Ninja Caches in Pool Region	59
Annex 9: Sighted weapons, Republic of Congo, July-August 2001	60
Annex 10: Map of RoC	62
Bibliography	63

Abbreviations

BZV	Brazzaville
CDS	Comité de Suivi (Follow-up Committee)
CFA	Central African Francs
CHU	Central University Hospital (Brazzaville)
CNR	Conseil national de resistance
DDR	Demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EUC	End-user certificate
FAC	Forcés Armées du Congo
FAR	Forcés Armées du Rwanda
FAZ	Forcés Armées du Zaïre
FDP	Forces démocratiques et patriotiques
FSU	Former Soviet Union
GPMG	General purpose machine gun
HMG	Heavy machine gun
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
MCDDI	Mouvement congolais pour la démocratie et le développement integral
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MIA	Ministry of Internal Affairs
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MONUC	United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
PCT	Parti congolais du travail (Sassou)
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
PMAK	Pistollet-mitrailleuse Kalashnikov (used to designate all AK models)
PRA	Participatory rural appraisal
PSP	Poste de Sécurité Publique
RoC	Republic of Congo
RPG	Rocket-propelled grenade launcher
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SALW	Small arms and light weapons
SAS	Small Arms Survey
SSI	Semi-structured interview
UNDP	United National Development Program
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
UPADS	Union panafricaine pour la démocratie sociale
URD	Union pour le renouveau démocratique
ZDI	Zimbabwean Defence Industries

Acknowledgments

The research team would like to express its gratitude to the staff—and in particular Maximo Halty and Stéphane Rostiaux—of the UNDP/IOM Reintegration of Ex-Combatants and Weapons Collection Programme for their assistance and support in the research and preparation of the report. The team would also like to express its gratitude to William Paton, UN Resident Co-ordinator and UNDP Resident Representative; General Mokoki, Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Congo (FAC); Jacques Bandelier, UNDP Deputy Resident Representative; and Geneviève Boutin, UN Coordination Unit. Finally, the research team would also like to thank those who provided valuable research and administrative support, including Dr. André Mbou, Head of CHU Statistical Division, Fidele Moukoyou, Nsiemo Droctovee Wenceslas, and the ex-combatant facilitators who administered the survey-questionnaire and accompanied the team on its field missions. The research team is also indebted to the invaluable support of the staff of the Small Arms Survey in Geneva, Switzerland.

The Small Arms Survey

The Small Arms Survey is an independent research project located at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. It is also linked to the Graduate Institute's Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies.

Established in 1999, the project is supported by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, and by contributions from the Governments of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. It collaborates with research institutes and non-governmental organizations in many countries including Brazil, Canada, Georgia, Germany, India, Israel, Norway, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The Small Arms Survey Special Reports series presents new and substantial research findings by project staff and commissioned researchers on data, methodological, and conceptual issues related to small arms, or detailed country and regional case studies. The series is published periodically and is available in hard copy and on the project's web site.

Small Arms Survey
Graduate Institute of International Studies
1st Floor
12 Avenue de Sécheron
1202 Geneva
SWITZERLAND

Phone: + 41 22 908 5777
Fax: + 41 22 732 2738
Email: smallarm@hei.unige.ch
Web site: <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org>

Executive Summary

Between 1993 and 1999 the Republic of Congo (RoC) experienced three conflicts involving heavily armed militia groups known as the ‘Cobra’, ‘Cocoye’, and ‘Ninjas’. Despite the end of the fighting and the formal disbanding of the militias, the vast majority of ex-combatants continue to possess weapons. Their continued marginalization from society, and the potential for renewed armed violence, constitute serious threats to security and sustainable development.

In order to assist the UNDP/IOM Reintegration of Ex-Combatants and Weapons Collection Programme—hereafter UNDP/IOM Programme—in its efforts to tackle these problems, a research team from the Small Arms Survey (SAS) was contracted to carry out an assessment of small arms availability and trade in the RoC. Over a period of eight weeks, the research team sought to: (1) elaborate a global profile of the total number of small arms and light weapons outside of government hands; (2) generate a geographic and demographic profile of the distribution of weapons; (3) assess current proliferation dynamics and a market profile of weapons in the region; and (4) highlight indicators that might usefully measure the impacts of available weapons on personal security and well-being. The purpose of the study was to directly inform the UNDP/IOM Programme by identifying tactical points of intervention and potential obstacles to programme success.

Key findings: Global estimate of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in RoC

Between 1993 and 1999 an estimated 74,000 weapons were acquired by the militias. Of these, 24,500 were looted or distributed from pre-1993 military and police holdings, while 49,500 were acquired from outside the country. In contrast, projections based on estimated militia force levels and patterns of weapons distribution yield an estimated 69,000 weapons in the possession of militias. Taking the average of these two figures yields a working global estimate of 71,500 weapons that were acquired or possessed. Adjusting this figure for weapons discarded or destroyed (20 per cent) and the 16,000 weapons collected to date—28 per cent of the total—yields an estimated **41,000 weapons** currently in circulation.

Page v

Total weapons available in RoC, 1999 and 2001				
Source	Acquisition average	Possession average	Global average	Anecdotal
Gross total (1999)	74,000	69,000	71,500	87,000
ADJ loss/destruction (20%)	59,000	55,000	57,000	69,500
ADJ Wpns Collection (16,000)	43,000	39,000	41,000	53,500
Total available (2001)	43,000	39,000	41,000	53,500

Key findings: Distribution of SALW in RoC

The 41,000 weapons estimated to be in the possession of militias are at present scattered throughout the country. As a result of progress in the peace process, the vast majority of these weapons are not openly carried by their owners, but instead stored in caches whose size varies from small individual to large collective holdings. Geographically, weapons are concentrated near the areas where they were first acquired or last used. Demographically, weapons are unevenly distributed among ex-combatants, with some possessing large individual holdings and others none. Findings indicate that significant concentrations of weapons are located in Brazzaville, throughout the region of Pool, and in key urban centres in the regions of Niari, Lekoumou, and Bouenza. In the northern regions of Congo, preliminary and anecdotal evidence suggests that overall quantities are small and concentrated in the towns of Impfondo, Owando, and the environs of Oyo.

General trends and patterns of weapons distribution	
Weapons retention rates	High rates of individual retention but uneven distribution of weapons among ex-combatants.
Geographic and demographic distribution of weapons	Weapons 'clustered' near site of acquisition or last use; uneven ownership of weapons among ex-combatants due to chaotic distribution of weapons.
Weapons caches	Three types of caches found in RoC: (1) small individual holdings (1–5 weapons); (2) medium-size individual holdings (5–10 weapons); and (3) large collective caches (100–400 weapons).
Types of weapons in circulation	Predominantly assault rifles, general purpose and heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPGs), and small mortars. Origin is predominantly eastern Europe and former Soviet Union (FSU), but also China, South Africa, and Israel.
Weapons turnover in the conflict period	Considerable weapons redistribution occurred during conflict periods due to defeats and disarming of casualties.
Current redistribution of weapons	Current redistribution displays a tendency for the consolidation of medium-sized caches.
Weapons storage	At least 50 per cent of weapons buried in sacks have high rate of attrition due to rust and will be unserviceable in the near future.

Weapons distribution by region and militia	
Brazzaville	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vast majority of ex-combatants in Brazzaville are Cobra (most of whom are also concentrated there). Smaller numbers of Cocoye and Ninja have migrated to Brazzaville seeking employment and alternative livelihoods. • Most weapons concentrated near military depots in district of Talangai, where they were originally obtained in 1997. • The majority of Cobra ex-combatants retain small caches of 2–5 weapons, for an average ratio of 3 weapons per person. This is due to lack of organizational coherence among Cobra militia structure and uncontrolled distribution of weapons. • Most holdings presumed to date from 1997.
Pool region	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vast majority of Ninja ex-combatants concentrated in Pool, where they are divided between the 'Nsiloulou' faction and a pro-Kolélas faction. Most reside in villages around key towns located along the railway linking Brazzaville to Pointe Noire. • Most Ninja weapons estimated to be located in large collective caches in rural settings throughout Pool. Sizes of caches range from 100 to 400 weapons. • A small percentage of Ninja ex-combatants still retain at least 1 weapon, while a significant portion (20 per cent) never received weapons. Most ex-combatants in Pool have surrendered most, if not all, their weapons to either the Comité de Suivi (CDS) or UNDP/IOM Programme.
Niari, Bouenza, and Lekoumou regions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vast majority of Cocoye ex-combatants concentrated in regions of Niari, Bouenza, and Lekoumou, with a minority in Kouilou region. • Relatively cohesive military organization has resulted in greater number of medium-sized group caches and more uneven distribution among ex-combatants. As a result, there is a great variation in patterns of weapons possession among ex-combatants. • Most weapons cached in urban centres or locations where they were last used.

Key findings: SALW proliferation and trade in RoC

Cross-border trade: The assessment of the cross-border trade to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Gabon, and Angola reveals a pattern of small-time weapons dealers whose activities do not appear to form part of larger networks. To a certain extent, this is due to the dynamics of weapons procurement in the region. In the DRC, rebel movements are in all likelihood similar to the militias in RoC in so far as weapons procurement depends on the initiative and resources of individual units or group commanders. In Angola, the long history of warfare has resulted in semi-professional standing armies with established large-scale procurement strategies and little need for engaging in ‘petty trade’. Finally, the dispersed distribution of weapons throughout Congo, together with the prevalence of individual ownership and small caches, renders bulk trading impracticable and most likely logistically impossible to organize.

Internal redistribution of weapons: Although not a weapons buy-back programme, the UNDP/IOM Programme has spurred the redistribution or sale of weapons that are then presented to enter the programme. The net result of this activity is not only the redistribution of weapons among ex-combatants—including the consolidation of large caches—but also a steady migration of ex-combatants to project sites. A worrying phenomenon is the possibility that individuals other than ex-combatants—civilians and members of foreign forces—are also engaging in this practice.

Demand for poaching weapons: There is a strong market for military weapons destined for poaching in the wildlife reserves throughout Congo. Evidence reveals that this trade is widespread and highly profitable due to the low prices of weapons—particularly outside Brazzaville—and the relative impunity with which poachers operate. Most weapons are reportedly sold directly from Brazzaville, Impfondo, and other regions near wildlife reserves.

Prices of Kalashnikov rifles		
Type	Price (USD)	Local price (CFA)
Weapons buy-back price (Government)	20–30	15,000–25,000
Street price in Brazzaville (RoC)	40–67	30,000–50,000
Street price in Sibiti (RoC)	13–27	10,000–20,000
Street price in Dolisie (RoC)	27–33	20,000–25,000
Street price in Cabinda (Angola)	33	25,000
Street price in Kinshasa (DRC)	200	150,000

Key findings: Measuring impacts of SALW in RoC

The research team identified three sectors that could usefully and rapidly be explored by the UNDP/IOM: health, crime, and participatory assessments. By measuring temporal changes in these three sectors, the UNDP/IOM Programme could begin to assess the extent to which weapons collection is improving—or not affecting—the overall climate of insecurity in a geographic local.

Effects on health: A direct effect of small arms on Congolese citizens is fatal and non-fatal injuries. An elementary epidemiological finding is that, for every death attributable to small arms, there are at least two or more injuries. Provided some degree of routine surveillance is conducted, these injuries can be analysed over time. In-patients records can be differentiated by sex and age, injury type, and related morbidity. From this perspective, small arms effects can be measured much like any disease constituting a serious threat to health, or an epidemic or public health crisis. Datasets for the hospitals of Talangai, Makélékélé, and CHU illustrate two trends: (1) that reported injuries are concentrated in North Brazzaville; and (2) that injuries are predominantly clustered among young males. This correlates with the finding that most weapons in Brazzaville are being held in the northern districts.

Effects on crime: Criminality can also be measured objectively, whether through firearm homicide rates, incidence of armed assault, armed robbery, intimidation with a weapon, and sexual violence. Other indicators relate to insurance premiums, the number and cost of private insurance companies or services, and forms of emigration. Together, these indicators provide an index of insecurity that is possible to evaluate over time. A preliminary review suggests that criminal activity has not soared in the post-conflict period, as in so many other countries recovering from war. Rather, key informants and focus group discussions reveal a general decline in widespread criminality—though reported incidents of weapons use remain common.

Participatory rural appraisal (PRA) and insecurity: The research team undertook a series of short rapid participatory appraisals of people's perceptions of insecurity in order to test the applicability of PRA. Several participatory tools were proposed, including semi-structured interviews (SSI), social and economic mapping, time-line drawing, and so forth. PRA exercises undertaken by the research team generated a range of possible indicators, including: the predominance of female-heads of households—measured by widows and single-mothers; the significant reduction of commercial or trading activity—particularly the number of formal and informal traders; the incidence of theft—indicated by stolen assets and household items; the forceful occupation of abandoned homes; and the incidence of temporary displacement. While incomplete and still requiring further analysis, these indicators suggest a novel approach to assessing firearm-related insecurity that may better address the perceptions and needs of affected populations.

Introduction

Trailing three separate internal armed conflicts in the Republic of Congo (RoC) is a legacy of violence and trauma. Although the incidence of armed violence has decreased somewhat since the cessation of hostilities at the end of 1999, small arms remain a ubiquitous feature of the Congolese landscape and a looming problem for human security, sustainable development, and reconstruction. In order to assist the UNDP/IOM Reintegration of Ex-combatants and Weapons Collection Programme in its efforts to tackle these problems, a research team from the Small Arms Survey (SAS) was contracted to carry out an assessment of small arms availability and trade in RoC. Over a period of eight weeks, the research team sought to: (1) elaborate a global profile of the total number of small arms and light weapons outside of government hands; (2) generate a geographic and demographic profile of the distribution of weapons; (3) assess current proliferation dynamics and a market profile of weapons in the region and; (4) highlight indicators that might usefully measure the impacts of available weapons on personal security and well-being. The purpose of the study was to directly inform the expansion strategy of the UNDP/IOM programme by addressing the issues raised in the study objectives, and identify tactical points of intervention and potential obstacles to programme success.

Objectives of the study

1. Determine a global estimate of SALW in the possession of militias (outside of government control today) and the proportion of overall holdings that have been collected by the IOM/UNDP Programme, CDS, or Ministry of the Interior or that have been discarded or destroyed.

2. Generate a geographic profile of current individual ex-combatant holdings and centralized militia caches, and the distribution of SALW among militias.

3. Assess current SALW proliferation in the RoC (in-country and transborder movements) through the identification of key transit points and the market structure (prices, sources and buyers, and commodity value of SALW) in urban centers.

Identify indicators that might usefully measure the impacts of the weapons-collection component on security and well-being. Propose methods to ensure the feasibility of their tracking and develop a tracking methodology.

The research team designed and implemented a series of methods to measure the scale and dimensions of SALW availability and trade in RoC. The methodology combined inductive and deductive approaches, including a large-scale survey of ex-combatants, to estimate the number of weapons currently in the possession of ex-combatants (see Annex 1 for the research matrix). Extensive key informant interviews and focus group discussions were also held with both the principal stakeholders in the peace process and those left out. Due to significant time constraints and difficulties encountered by the research team to obtain official government statistics and information, the findings and conclusions should be taken as illustrating key patterns and trends. The research team felt that, although exhaustive detail and accuracy are important, they should not substitute for a solid and comprehensive sense of the overall picture.

In carrying out its assessment, the research team decided to focus specifically on small arms and light weapons (SALW), and not include explosives—including grenades—and ammunition. There were two reasons for this decision. First, because of their size and low price, efforts to determine their availability would have been frustrated by resource and time constraints. Second, it became eminently clear from the beginning that, in spite of their 'lethality', SALW and not explosives are the prime instruments used in crime and low-scale warfare in the RoC. In addition, ammunition, while indispensable, is virtually impossible to trace and easily acquired from sources outside the country.

Weapons currently in circulation. There are estimated to be between 39,000 and 43,000 small arms currently in circulation. The estimated global average is therefore 41,000 weapons. The weapons collection component of the UNDP/IOM Programme has collected approximately 2,800 weapons, or the equivalent of five per cent of the (pre-2000) total from society. Assuming that the weapons collected by the Comité de Suivi (CDS) in 1999–2000 have not been re-circulated, the combined quantity of small arms taken out of ex-combatant hands since 1999 amounts to 28 per cent of all weapons in circulation (i.e. 16,000 weapons).

Weapons possession and holdings. Current personal holdings (by militia) indicate that there are many weapons remaining in civilian hands. The research team estimates that approximately 14,500 remain among the Cobras, 8,300 within Ninja ranks, and 21,700 among the Cocoye.¹ Empirical findings, however, reveal that weapons are unevenly distributed among ex-combatants, with significant proportions retaining no weapons while others retain medium to large individual holdings of three or more weapons.

The following report will highlight and review the key findings of the eight-week study. The first section provides a brief review of the evolution and organization of the militias. Section two assesses the total estimated number of weapons in circulation by reviewing patterns and trends in weapons acquisition and possession. The third section reviews the geographic and demographic distribution of personal and factional militia holdings, drawing on findings from the large-scale survey-questionnaire and a series of visits to the interior of the country. Section four provides a brief evaluation of arms proliferation inside and outside RoC, and black market values and market structures. The final section reviews objective and subjective 'impact indicators' in order to begin thinking critically about measuring the success or failure of weapons collection in the country.

Definition of small arms and light weapons used in this study

Small arms include 'revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns and light machine guns'.

Light weapons refer to 'heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missile systems and mortars of less than 100mm calibre'.

Source: United Nations (1997)

The UNDP/IOM Reintegration of Ex-Combatants and Weapons Collection Programme

The joint UNDP/IOM initiative launched in July 2000 is an integrated approach to mitigating the dangers posed by armed and marginalised ex-combatants in the Republic of Congo. In contrast to formal demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) programs that treat reintegration and disarmament as separate components, the UNDP/IOM Programme links the provision of reintegration assistance with voluntary weapons collection in order to simultaneously tackle both dimensions of the problem.

Reintegrating ex-combatants. The reintegration component of the UNDP/IOM Programme tackles current sources of insecurity by promoting attitudinal shifts regarding weapons use by ex-combatants and reinforcing conditions for social security. Reintegration benefits offer ex-combatants an alternative and more durable livelihood by giving them a stake in social and economic life. Reintegration assistance—in the form of either employment within existing companies or the creation of micro-enterprises—directly reduces their dependence on violent forms of income generation (banditry and theft) and, by implication, their need for weapons.

Collecting weapons. The collection of weapons from ex-combatants is indispensable to the success of the programme. Reducing weapons supply diminishes the potential for armed violence and a recourse to weapons. The surrender of a weapon also reinforces reintegration insofar as it symbolizes a reorientation from a warrior mentality towards a constructive engagement with society. At the political level, the physical act of surrendering weapons mitigates the perceived threat of ex-combatants to local authorities and bolsters the will of the latter to engage in non-violent dialogue and reconciliation.

Results to date. In both theory and practice, the link established by the project between reintegration and weapons collection is simple. Although reintegration assistance is available to all ex-combatants, those who surrender weapons receive priority treatment. In practice, this system has surpassed expectations (and original project targets) due to the vast majority of beneficiaries who have handed in weapons. Although there is no established exchange ratio for the number of weapons needed to obtain priority treatment, such a linkage creates the possibility of identifying and collecting large quantities of weapons in a short period of time. To date, the project has successfully reintegrated 7,300 ex-combatants (for a total of 2,300 micro-projects), and collected 2,800 small arms and light weapons and 8,000 grenades and other explosives.²

Challenges. The lack of a formal demobilization process in RoC and of viable data on both militia force levels and small arms availability have created a difficult environment for project implementation. The lack of formal criteria to identify ex-combatants is an obstacle to developing an effective screening process, while lack of data on small arms availability and distribution impedes the refinement of realistic weapons-collection targets for individual beneficiaries and the project as a whole. The project's implementation in Brazzaville, however, illustrates both the importance and viability of the current approach. It is hoped that the lessons emerging from this experience, and the indicators on small arms availability and distribution researched in this study, will enable the project to refine its implementation strategy and targeting in the upcoming expansion of activities throughout RoC.

Section 1: Background on the Militias and Conflicts in Congo

Militias have constituted an integral part of political and social life in RoC since independence from France in 1960. This phenomenon has its roots in divergent interests between political leaders and the army, and the progressive militarization of politics as formal channels for dialogue were obstructed or bypassed. Political crises and widespread violence in 1959 and between 1964 and 1969 led Congolese leaders to create armed civilian militias as measures to safeguard personal power bases and achieve political objectives. During the crises of 1964–68, the para-statal armed formation known as the ‘Defense Civile’—originally created by Pascal Lissouba to eventually replace the ‘colonial’ army with a genuine ‘peoples’ army’—served to institutionalize civilian militias as an informal substitute for, and alternative to, the forces of law and order. For the youth who joined the militias, membership was regarded as the first step towards a career in the army.³

The origin of the militias. The end of one-party rule in 1991 and a series of elections in 1992 led to a period of political instability and conflict over power between Pascal Lissouba, former prime minister and head of the Union panafricaine pour la démocratie sociale (UPADS), and the opposition consisting primarily of Denis Sassou-Nguesso, head of the Parti congolais du travail (PCT), and Bernard Kolélas, head of a coalition known as the Union pour le renouveau démocratique (URD). Amid charges of electoral fraud, Bernard Kolélas organized a campaign of civil disobedience in 1993 in the districts of Bacongo and Makélékélé in Brazzaville. The eventual government response—a massive use of force by the FAC in November 1993—prompted the creation of the Ninja, a group of armed self-defence groups from the southern districts of Brazzaville that united around the figure of Kolélas (Bazenguissa-Ganga, 1996, pp. 10–12). Sassou, for his part, consolidated the diverse security forces and neighbourhood self-defence groups loyal to him into the Forces démocratiques et patriotiques (FDP), a militia better known as the Cobras. Faced with an army whose members maintained neutrality or allied with Sassou, Lissouba created a state militia, known as the Réserve Ministérielle, to defend his administration and power base. These were subsequently joined by the Zoulous, neighbourhood self-defence groups from the district of Mfilou in Brazzaville (Pourtier, 1998, p. 15).

Page 4

The 1993–1994 conflict. The recourse to extra-political means to settle political questions quickly escalated into urban warfare between the FAC and pro-Lissouba militias on the one hand and the Ninja on the other. In this context appeals to common ethnicity—each leader claimed to represent the interests of a particular ethnic group and region—were used to mobilize ‘recruits’ and control social movement within Brazzaville; this led to widespread ethnic discrimination. Although during this period the size of the militias was not large—up to 2,000 combatants—each received a modicum of training and support and was relatively well-organized. Between late 1993 and mid-1994 numerous armed confrontations took place in Brazzaville and its environs, resulting in 2,000 dead and 100,000 displaced (Pourtier, 1998, p. 17). Despite the reconciliation between Lissouba and Kolélas in 1994—the latter being named mayor of Brazzaville—each political figure including Sassou maintained his forces. Lissouba, for his part, continued to train members of the Réserve Ministérielle, together with other loyal irregular groups, in the training camps of Loudima and Aubeville in Bouenza.

The 1997 conflict. The failure of the Congolese government to disarm the militias and reintegrate the majority into the armed forces, together with continuing political instability, led to fighting in June 1997 following a failed attempt to disarm Sassou militants. During this conflict, the Cobra militia fought against the militias of Lissouba—now consolidated and known as the Cocoyes—in Brazzaville. The army, which had been in a process of disintegration following the political polarization from 1994 onwards, ceased to be an effective force or actor in political and military affairs. In contrast to the 1993–94 conflict, which can be characterized as a low-level insurgency against government authority, the 1997 conflict was over the leadership of Congo. These higher stakes drove

each side—with the exception of Kolélas and the Ninja militia, who remained neutral until July, when they joined Lissouba forces—to mobilize massive numbers of combatants who were enticed with weapons and a promise of spoils. Due to the inexperience of the vast majority of combatants, the conflict turned into a military stalemate until external reinforcements permitted Sassou forces to obtain the offensive advantage. Together with foreign mercenaries and other forces from Rwanda, DRC, Chad, and Angola, Cobra forces managed to retake Brazzaville and most of the northern and central regions of the country. By the end of the conflict in October 1997, an estimated 10,000 people had been killed, and hundreds of thousands of others displaced.

The 1998–1999 rebellions. Starting in 1998, the Congolese government launched two operations—Colombe I and II—in order to pacify the southern regions of the country and disarm the Cocoye and Ninja militias. The excessive use of force by the FAC, Police Nationale, and Cobra forces sparked rebellions in the regions of Bouenza and Pool in late 1998 and culminated in full-scale fighting throughout the south and Brazzaville until November 1999, when a general cease-fire was signed. During this conflict, the Cocoye were transformed into the military wing of a guerrilla resistance movement known as the Conseil National de Resistance (CNR) and headed by Pascal Lissouba. The Ninjas, for their part, were torn by factional strife and divided into two groups, the Nsiloulou, headed by the Reverend Pasteur Ntoumi, and a group loyal to Kolelas. As in 1997, both militias took advantage of fear and anger to recruit and arm thousands of local inhabitants, ostensibly for self-defence, to resist the imposition of central authority. Following a year of armed violence, the intervention of foreign forces on the side of the government, widespread looting and execution of civilians and massive displacement, conflict fatigue, and desperation led many of the key actors to the negotiating table where, in November 1999, a general cease-fire was signed in Pointe Noire and an inclusive body—the Comité de Suivi (CDS)—established to oversee its terms.

The cease-fire signed in November and December 1999 by the main belligerents in the conflict set down a series of provisions including the disarmament and demobilization of militias, their reintegration into the armed forces, Police Nationale, and Gendarmerie, and the convocation of a 'National Dialogue' on the constitutional and political future of the country. The CDS was charged with overseeing the implementation of the immediate provisions, notably disarmament and demobilization, and completed its work in late 2000. The National Dialogue, which was held in April 2001, established a timetable for elections. Although the peace has in general held, dissatisfaction with the peace process, the continued presence of foreign forces deployed throughout the southern region, and lack of progress in the political and military reintegration of the rebellious forces continues to fuel instability and tension in the interior. The process of reconciliation is still frustrated by the persistence of mistrust between the various factions.

Section 2: Global Estimate of Militia Holdings

Objective

Determine a global estimate of SALW in the possession of militias—outside of government control today—and the proportion of overall holdings that have been collected by the UNDP/IOM Programme, CDS, and Ministry of the Interior, or that have been discarded or destroyed.

Every conflict, whether between states or groups within a state, generates its own unique dynamic and logic of weapons acquisition. In Congo, most fighting took place between militia groups consisting largely of irregular and untrained civilians and supported by dominant political figures. In contrast to other internal conflicts, the regular army disintegrated and for the most part was unable to influence the course of the conflicts. Due to a lack of military discipline within the militias, not to mention their innate fractiousness, the conflicts themselves were characterized by a high degree of chaotic behaviour. In this context, militia leaders were dependent on a steady stream of financial and military resources to maintain a modicum of cohesion and loyalty. The modalities of weapons acquisition reflect this organization—or lack thereof. These were characterized by both widespread looting of military and government weapons depots and the procurement of weapons on international markets.


The absence of coherent military structures, procedures, and strategizing rendered rational and efficient weapons acquisition and distribution impossible. As a result, weapons procurement was conducted in a haphazard manner based not on identified needs or force levels but rather desperation, available resources, and a crude interpretation of peoples' war doctrine. As a result, massive quantities of weapons were distributed to militias without any mechanisms to register ownership or ascertain that they were properly dispersed. At present, and given the quantities lost, destroyed, or collected, the vast majority of these weapons remain in the possession of ex-combatants.

Page 6

Figure 1. Total weapons available in RoC, 1999 and 2001

Source	Acquisition average	Possession average	Global average	Anecdotal
Gross total (1999)	74,000	69,000	71,500	87,000
ADJ loss/destruction (20%)	59,000	55,000	57,000	69,500
ADJ wpns collection (16,000)	43,000	39,000	41,000	53,500
Total available (2001)	43,000	39,000	41,000	53,500

From information on pillaged depots and arms purchases, it can be ascertained that between 1993 and 1999 an estimated 74,000 weapons were acquired by the militias. Of these, 24,500 were looted or distributed from pre-1993 military and police holdings, while 49,500 were acquired from outside the country. Due to gaps in the data on weapons acquisitions, these figures may under-represent a probable lower total weapons availability. Projections based on estimated militia force levels and patterns of weapons distribution yield an estimated 69,000 weapons in the possession of militias. Taking the average of these two figures yields a working global estimate of 71,500 weapons that were acquired and in the possession of ex-combatants in 1999.



To obtain an estimate of the quantity of weapons currently in circulation, the numbers of weapons destroyed or otherwise lost must be deducted together with the total collected to date. Assuming that one in five weapons were lost or destroyed—based on key-informant interviews and assessments on rates of natural and conflict-induced loss and attrition—this yields a figure of 57,000 weapons that can be estimated to have been in circulation at the end of 1999.⁴ The 16,000 weapons claimed to have been collected to date by the government (approximately 6,500 weapons), the CDS (approximately 7,000 weapons) and the UNDP/IOM Programme (approximately 2,800 weapons) represent approximately 28 per cent of the total in circulation in 1999. The total quantity remaining in circulation today can thus be estimated at approximately 41,000 weapons. Figure 2 illustrates a probable breakdown of weapons for each militia based on estimates derived from UNDP/IOM Programme data on militia force levels. The following sections describe in detail the evidence on which these estimations are based, as well as the different methodological strategies utilized.

Note on methodology (1)

In order to establish the total quantity of SALW⁵ currently possessed by ex-combatants, the research team utilized a dual methodological strategy that consisted of: (1) an **'acquisition approach'** (i.e. projecting a global estimate on the basis of identified weapons looted or procured); and (2) a **'possession approach'** (i.e. projecting a global estimate on the basis of data on militia size and weapons possession patterns). Due to the fragmentary, incomplete, and anecdotal nature of the data obtained, projections and estimations can produce an indication only of the likely order of magnitude rather than precise quantities.

The **acquisition approach** assesses and verifies SALW acquisitions over the duration of the three conflicts in order to generate an estimate of the total quantity of weapons acquired by the militias. The data is drawn from primary (e.g. government documentation, airway bills, invoices, end-user certificates, etc.) and secondary (e.g. international and local media) sources. Vital data was also generated from interviews with ex-combatants, former militia unit commanders, and military officers.

The **possession approach** assesses patterns in SALW possession and distribution in order to predict gross militia holdings. Data was generated from controlled and standardized surveys administered for each militia group and sampled throughout the country (see the second note on methodology for a detailed description of the survey). Projections were then made from this data on the basis of estimated militia force levels and distribution patterns adjusted for selection bias.⁶ The data was supplemented with qualitative information generated from semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions—including participatory exercises—and on-site inspections.

Both approaches rely on predictive modelling. Predictive modelling techniques are by nature imprecise and are frequently based on a number of key variables. The central challenge was to measure a number of key variables in a tense and unpredictable environment. Even with official authorization, for example, information on the size of the Congolese military and police forces (between 1963 and 1993) and the ratio of weapons to men (including reserves) remained unavailable to the research team, necessitating the development of proxy variables. Moreover, essential variables for the possession approach, such as the actual size of the militia, the average size of weapons holdings (individual and collective caches), and the physical distribution of holdings also depended on proxy variables—in this case census data and projections from survey data.

Adjusting for weapons loss and destruction: Throughout the conflict period, considerable quantities of weapons were lost, discarded, or destroyed. Large numbers of Ninja combatants threw their weapons into the Djoué river as they fled Brazzaville at the end of the 1997 conflict, while a major cache of Cocoye weapons in Pointe Noire was destroyed prior to the occupation of the city by Sassou forces. In addition, and although militias looted the vast majority of weapons originally in government holdings, remaining FAC, Police, and Gendarmerie forces retained a token quantity of weapons. Time and material resources precluded an in-depth investigation of these rates of loss; instead, overall estimated quantities of weapons in militia possession have been adjusted on the assumption that the above constitute approximately 20 per cent of overall holdings.

Adjusting for ex-combatants not in possession of weapons: Not all ex-combatants currently possess weapons. In order to reflect this reality, estimates of weapons availability need to be adjusted for the percentage of ex-combatants who never possessed weapons or lost their weapons in both the conflict and the post-conflict periods. Although an in-depth assessment of this phenomenon was not possible, the research team obtained indicators that provided an approximate order of magnitude. These indicators include: (1) approximately 20 per cent of Ninja combatants who never received military weapons; (2) the large proportion of Cocoye fleeing Brazzaville in 1997 who were disarmed by Ninja combatants in Pool region; (3) weapons collected or seized by the government between 1997 and 1999; and (4) weapons lost in the course of the conflicts. On the basis of these indicators it can be inferred that approximately 20 per cent of all ex-combatants do not currently possess weapons.

Acquisition of small arms and light weapons (1993–1999)

During the conflicts of the 1990s, militia combatants acquired their weapons from two principal sources: the looting of military and police depots, and weapons purchased on their behalf from outside the country. Additional, albeit negligible, sources include weapons taken from enemy units—i.e. who had either been killed or had fled—and those distributed to civilian militias in the 1960s and 1970s and still in circulation—e.g. rifles and MAS-38 sub-machine guns. In order to determine a global estimate of SALW outside of government control, this section estimates government holdings (pre-1993) and external purchases (1993–97) on the basis of verified information. These projections are then matched to evidence from the field.⁷

Deductive projections and estimations, together with an empirical assessment of substantiated evidence, yields an estimated total 67,500–80,500 weapons acquired by the militias, or an estimated average of 74,000 (see Figure 3). When adjusted for the estimated quantity of weapons destroyed or lost (20 per cent of the total) and collected by the CDS, government, and IOM/UNPD Programme—a total of 16,000 weapons—the total quantity of weapons remaining can be estimated at between 38,000 and 48,500, or an average of 43,000. The empirical assessment of 87,000 weapons acquired—based on eye-witness accounts, investigative research, and structured interviews—yields an adjusted estimate of 53,500 weapons. Although higher due to the tendency of informants to inflate perceived quantities, this empirical value corroborates to a large extent the total calculated on the basis of documentary evidence and projections.

Figure 3. Total weapons acquired by militia forces, and quantity available today

Source	Lower threshold	Upper threshold	Average
Government holdings	18,000	31,000	24,500
Transfers	49,500	49,500	49,500
Total acquired (1993-1997)	67,500	80,500	74,000
Adjustment for loss/destruction (20 per cent)	54,000	64,500	59,000
Adjustment for weapons collected (16,000)	38,000	48,500	43,000
Total available (2001)	38,000	48,500	43 000

Weapons acquired from pre-1993 government holdings

Not unlike other countries, the exigencies of state and military secrecy significantly reduce the possibilities for acquiring detailed records on government holdings, or inspections of large military and police depots. The research team was, however, able to obtain reliable data on the size of the Congolese armed forces for the period until 1993. On the basis of these figures—in addition to information from key informants on weapons reserves—high and low estimates of government holdings were generated. According to these calculations, an estimated average of 24,500 weapons from pre-1993 government stocks were appropriated by the militia between 1993 and 1999.

Estimating government weapons holdings (pre-1993). The majority of the country’s weapons’ depots were—and continue to be—located in Brazzaville, followed by Pointe Noire and Dolisie. All military, police, and gendarmerie units also retained small reserves in their barracks or headquarters.⁸ Typically, a proportion of unserviceable weapons were repaired in workshops in Brazzaville.⁹ Though the weapons distribution system suffered from a notable absence of appropriate rules governing proper storage and maintenance,¹⁰ one can safely assume that there were sufficient weapons for each soldier and

policeman, and that reserves were relatively well stocked. The lower and upper thresholds highlighted in Figure 4 are intended to capture variations in the physical size of weapons reserves. The dramatic collapse of law and order over the course of the three conflicts, together with widespread ransacking and looting of government arsenals by all militia, indicates that the vast majority of weapons currently in circulation were at one point taken from official control.¹¹

Figure 4. Estimated government holdings, pre-1993
(Data on force levels from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute)

	Men	Lower threshold		Upper threshold	
		Weapons per person	SALW	Weapons per person	SALW
Army	8,000	1.1	8,800	2.0	16,000
Navy	800	1.1	880	1.5	1,200
Air force	1,200	1.1	1,320	1.5	1,800
Paramilitary	2,000	1.1	2,200	2.0	4,000
National police	1,500	1.0	1,500	2.0	3,000
Gendarmerie	2,000	1.0	2,000	1.5	3,000
People's militia	3,000	0.4	1,200	0.7	2,100
Totals	18,500		17,900		31,100

Page 10

Weapons acquisition in 1993–94. Weapons acquisition during the conflict of 1993–94 was primarily characterized by the looting of police and military weapons depots, and the free distribution of weapons from government arsenals.¹² The Aubeville and Zulu militias (pro-Lissouba groups that eventually united to form the ‘Cocoye’ militia) allegedly received weapons from the government.¹³ The Ninjas, on the other hand, obtained weapons directly from fallen and ambushed FAC troops, and from the looting of Postes de Sécurité Publique (PSPs) in the Makélékélé and Baongo districts of Brazzaville, as well as throughout the region of Pool. Some weapons were also taken from military camps in Pool. Due their alliance with Sassou’s forces at the time, the Ninjas also received weapons from them via Kinshasa.¹⁴ Although not directly involved in the fighting, Cobra forces raided the Military Academy in Gamboma in late 1994 and looted an estimated 800 weapons, half of which were given to the Ninjas.¹⁵

Weapons acquisition in 1997. During the start of the 1997 war, Cobra forces rearmed themselves in a climate of increasing violence. Some of these weapons were obtained from government holdings by FAC officers dismissed by Lissouba, and stockpiled in the homes of other officers in northern Brazzaville.¹⁶ Following the failed attempt by government forces to capture Sassou at his residence, Cobra forces attacked and looted the military depots located in the district of Talangai, securing approximately a half to a third of the pre-1993 FAC holdings; Cobra forces also attacked and looted the PSPs in northern Brazzaville.¹⁷ Following their entrance into the war in July 1997 on the side of the Cocoye, the Ninjas obtained considerable amounts of weapons from military, police, and gendarmerie depots in Brazzaville, as well as direct distributions from the office of the presidency.¹⁸ The only weapons acquired by the Cocoye outside the presidency were those allegedly ‘skimmed off’ the stocks being safeguarded for UNITA at that time.¹⁹

Weapons acquisition in 1998–99. The resumption of hostilities in the interior between 1998 and 1999 led to another wave of attacks on government weapons depots. The Ninjas, during this period

largely dispersed throughout Pool region, once again looted PSPs and military detachments (notably in towns along the railway linking Brazzaville and Pointe Noire) and took weapons from defeated enemy.²⁰ To the weapons acquired in this manner must be added an undetermined number of weapons that were taken from Cocoye forces in late 1997 as they fled to their home villages from Brazzaville via Pool—up to 50 per cent of Cocoye forces were purportedly disarmed in this manner.²¹ During 1998–99 Cocoye forces dispersed throughout the regions of Bouenza, Niari, and Lekoumou also obtained weapons from police and military depots and fallen Angolan and FAC soldiers.²²

The widespread looting of police and military depots between 1993 and 1999 by three separate militia groups was made possible primarily by the deterioration of the armed forces in Congo and the subsequent loss of control over key installations. Although it cannot be conclusively established that all weapons were looted, the duration of the conflicts and the political and military primacy of the militias—they replaced, for all practical purposes, the official armed forces—strongly suggests that a massive redistribution of government holdings did occur. Even where these weapons were not directly given to militia combatants, they were being held in reserve for that eventuality.

Weapons procured from abroad, 1993–97

In contrast to the conflict of 1993–94, a war that was fought primarily with weapons pillaged from government depots, the conflict of 1997 entailed significant arms purchases from abroad—arms that were ultimately destined for the Cocoye and Cobra militia. There is little evidence of further purchases during the 1998–99 conflict—though the possibility that additional acquisitions were made by the Sassou administration exists. Even so, research into this time period fell outside the mandate of the research team.

Page 11

The murkiness and ad hoc nature of ‘secret’ arms purchases during the separate periods of conflict make it extremely difficult to develop a detailed or verified assessment of the quantities or types of weapons transferred to the various militias. Nonetheless, information from a variety of sources suggests that the majority of weapons used in the various conflicts came from abroad. According to these findings, arms purchases by belligerents between 1993 and 1997 resulted in the acquisition of an estimated 49,500 weapons. These are partial and incomplete estimates, and do not include values for other suspected shipments. These figures should be taken therefore as representing a conservative probable estimate of overall quantities.

Weapons procured by the Lissouba regime. Large quantities of weapons were purchased by Pascal Lissouba between 1994 and 1997, mainly from Israel, South Africa, and China (see Figure 5). In 1994, as part of a larger package deal with the Israeli firm Levdan—which included military trainers—substantial quantities of weapons (Uzis and Galils) were reportedly purchased.²³ Subsequently, in instalments beginning in 1995, large amounts of weapons were acquired from Bulgaria and transhipped via South Africa with the assistance of Rudolph Wollenhaupt and Jacques Monsieur, both infamous arms brokers in the Central African region.²⁴ Between 1996 and 1997, the Congolese government also received several shipments of heavy and light weapons from the South African government.²⁵ Other weapons purchases for this period include a reported nine aircraft-loads of weapons from China that were brokered by the Zimbabwean Defence Industries (ZDI) and unverified transfers from Romania and Central Asia.²⁶

The RPO-A Shmel

The RPO-A Shmel is a rocket-propelled incendiary/blast projectile launcher produced in Russia (since 1988) and China (1998). Originally produced for use against cave structures in Afghanistan, the RPO-A is a highly lethal weapon in urban close combat settings, and particularly effective against defended structures and equipment: buildings, bunkers, defensive fortifications, and vehicles. The RPO-A is classified as a 'thermobaric' weapon due to its utilization of fuel-air explosive techniques to create an explosion that is equivalent to a 122mm artillery projectile. Upon detonation, the thermobaric mixture ignites all the oxygen within an impact radius of 50m², creating a massive fireball and instantly raising the temperature by 800 degrees centigrade. The RPO-A Shmel is a single-use, disposable weapon often provided in packs of two—the launching tube is discarded after use—whose 93mm projectile possesses an effective range of 20–1,000 meters.

To date, the weapon has been in use only by Russian forces against Chechen rebels, and there are no indications it has been sold to, or acquired by, any other governments. The RPO-A is not classified as a chemical weapon, as it is designed to incapacitate through explosion and not the working of chemical agents on the human system. According to Human Rights Watch, however, the use of such a highly destructive weapon in urban settings—16 times more effective than conventional high-explosives—makes it almost impossible to avoid civilian casualties. The RPO-A is currently not banned under international humanitarian law or the Chemical and Biological Weapons Treaty, though there has been discussion on whether it should be prohibited as an inhumane weapon (Human Rights Watch, 2000).

Page 12

These purchases were not organized through the procurement division of the Ministry of Defence but rather through the Office of the Presidency, where control regarding distribution remained in the hands of Lissouba.²⁷ According to a number of sources, a portion of these weapons was transported by train to Cocoye strongholds in the regions of Niari, Bouenza, and Lekoumou.²⁸ The rest were sent to Brazzaville, Owando, Ouesso, and Impfondo. Although the majority of these weapons were directly distributed to Cocoye and Ninja combatants (the latter due to the merging of their military commands late in the 1997 conflict), a certain amount were stocked in the weapons depots of Pointe Noire and Brazzaville.²⁹



An RPO-A Shmel located in Congo-Brazzaville, 2001.

Figure 5. Identified weapons transfers into Congo, 1994–1997

Date	Origin of shipment	Origin of weapons	Supplier / Broker	Value (USD millions)	Estimated SALW acquired	Weapon types	Package contents	Sources
1994	Israel	Israel	LEVDAN	50	2,000	Galil assault rifles; uzi sub-machine guns	Military trainers, SALW, and ammunition	Media, corroborated testimonies
1996	South Africa	SA military industry	SA govt	14	10,600	Vector R4/R5 assault rifles	Heavy and light weaponry	National Conventional Arms Control Committee
1997	South Africa	SA military industry	SA govt	1.6	5,300	Vector R4/R5 assault rifles	SALW	National Conventional Arms Control Committee
1995-97	Unknown	Eastern European	Monsieur/Wollenhaupt (Ebar Management)	62.43	13,550	AK-47 assault rifles, RPG-7s, pistols	Vehicles, aircraft, heavy and light weaponry, supplies	Media, Documents pour l'histoire
1997	China	China	ZDI/NORINCO	-	10,000	Type-56 assault rifles, SKS rifles	9 aircraft (Ilyushin 76), loads of SALW and ammunition	Investigative research
May 1997	DRC	Bulgaria	-	-	5,000	AKS-47 assault rifles	SALW (PM Noire)	Corroborated testimonies, Investigative research
Sept 1997	Angola	FSU, Eastern Europe	-	-	1,500	AK-47 assault rifles, RPOA 'Shmel', GPMGs, HMGs	SALW, ammunition	Corroborated testimonies,
Sept 1997	Gabon	FSU, Eastern Europe	-	-	1,500	AK-47 assault rifles, RPOA 'Shmel', GPMGs, HMGs	Aircraft, vehicles, heavy and light weaponry, ammunition	Corroborated testimonies,

Weapons procured by the forces of Denis Sassou Nguesso: Weapons were purchased in 1997 at two critical junctures in the conflict. At the outbreak of hostilities, Cobra combatants managed to intercept a shipment of Bulgarian-made AKS-47s in Kinshasa destined for the Congolese government or UNITA forces in Angola.³⁰ These weapons were purchased from the intermediaries organizing the shipment and transported by pirogue to the district of Mpila in Brazzaville. There they were stockpiled in the homes of pro-Sassou officers.³¹ In addition, Cobra forces received at least two major shipments of heavy and light weapons, armoured vehicles, and ammunition from Angola and Gabon in September 1997. The former were allegedly air-dropped by the Angolan army north of Brazzaville, while the latter were flown into the town of Oyo and subsequently transported by road to Brazzaville.³² These shipments, arriving at a time when weapons supplies and ammunition were at a critical low point, provided them with the means to eventually turn the tide of the conflict.

Among these latter shipments were significant quantities of the RPO-A “Shmel”, an extremely lethal weapon that uses fuel-air explosive techniques to create destruction equivalent to a 122mm artillery shell (see above for a description of this weapon). Although produced and sold by both Russia—where it was first developed and used against Chechens in the mid-1990s—and China, this is the first time this weapon has been seen in the possession of a non-state actor: the Cobra militia. Although not formally banned under treaty law, the lethality of this weapon and its indiscriminate use not only alters the balance of force in a context largely dominated by the Kalashnikov but poses a formidable danger in the post-conflict context due to their continued and uncontrolled circulation among ex-combatants.

Possession of small arms and light weapons, 1993-1999

Another way to assess the global number of small arms currently in circulation is to generate projections from the total number of ex-combatants—based on UNDP/IOM Programme estimates—and rates and trends in weapons possession—based on a survey of 240 ex-combatants. Although an estimation, this provides additional insight and verification on overall weapons holdings. This section first presents a working estimate of militia size, including lower and upper thresholds, and then details trends and patterns in weapons possession that emerge from the survey data.

Estimating militia size

The conflicts in Congo-Brazzaville were fought between militias consisting primarily of irregular elements over whom little central control was exercised. The reliance of militia leaders on irregulars who spontaneously joined or left the fighting—not to mention the nature of the fighting itself which oscillated between guerrilla warfare and a mass civil resistance movement—resulted in constantly changing force levels. In other words, the size and coherence of the militias was never stable but rather in a constant state of flux. During the conflict of 1993–94, total militia force levels were limited—i.e. not more than 2,000—limited to a defined geographic space, and relatively well trained. During the 1997 and 1998–99 conflicts, and with the extension of fighting into the interior, military exigencies called for mass recruitment. The corollary of this strategy included a policy of free weapons distribution. Predictably, militia ranks swelled to include thousands of disaffected and opportunistic youth who, with little or no formal training, received weapons and were sent to the ‘front’. The combination of ‘spontaneous recruitment’ and the utter lack of control over and registration of combatants renders a precise estimate of militia size impossible.

In order to overcome these limitations, the research team developed estimates of militia force levels on the basis of UNDP/IOM figures. This allowed the team to develop a lower and upper threshold for total militia force levels of 26,000–36,400 combatants, and to calculate a probable average total size of 31,200 combatants. These are represented below in Figure 6. These estimates are indicative of the largest possible size attained by the militias during the peak of their activity, and inclusive of not only ‘hard-core’ combatants but also irregulars, civilian ‘resisters’, and the entire contingent of unarmed informants, ‘*éclaireurs*’, logisticians, propagandists, and ‘service-suppliers’. This approach broadens the target population beyond combatants to include all who were associated with the militias. This is done in order to allow a more comprehensive approach to all militia elements that might, at some point or another, have acquired possession of a weapon.

Page 14

Lower threshold for militia force levels. In order to identify its target beneficiary population, and in the absence of any other indicators, the UNDP/IOM Programme developed estimates of militia force levels based on registration lists compiled by former unit commanders, and through extensive discussions and direct observations in the context of numerous field missions and activities. These estimations reflect for the most part ‘true’ combatants, or those who received a modicum of training and were involved in a particular militia on a long-term basis, but do not necessarily reflect armed irregulars who remain outside quasi-formal militia structures.

Upper threshold for militia force levels. During its time in RoC, the research team received numerous indications that at critical points in the conflict period large numbers of youth ‘spontaneously’ joined the militias on an irregular and short-term basis. Because these individuals were also provided with weapons, they fall within the scope of the present study. In order to reflect this reality, an upper threshold for militia force levels has been calculated on the assumption that, in addition to the lower threshold force level, an additional 40 per cent (on average) were irregular combatants. Although a crude measure, it nonetheless permits the calculation of a more realistic estimate of the probable numbers of armed ex-combatants in RoC.

Figure 6. Estimates of militia size


	Lower threshold	Upper threshold	Average
Cobra	11,000	15,400	13,200
Ninja	6,000	8,400	7,200
Cocoye	9,000	12,600	10,800
Total	26,000	36,400	31,200

Estimating average militia holdings

Patterns and trends in the distribution of weapons within militias is a function both of their irregular organization and lack of internal coherence, and of the modalities of weapons acquisition—including the total acquired. Available evidence suggests that large numbers of Cobra combatants acquired on average between two and five weapons from widespread looting and that the extreme disorganization of the militia prevented further control or redistribution of these weapons. The distribution of weapons to Cocoyes, on the other hand, was markedly uneven, with unit commanders retaining a greater degree of control over weapons stocks (especially reserves). Finally, Ninja combatants, despite acquiring most of their weapons in an uncontrolled manner, possessed the highest degree of internal coherence and discipline, leading to considerable control over individual weapons-holdings. Like information on the numbers of combatants, however, information on militia weapons stocks was not recorded (or recordable) due to the disorganized nature of weapons distribution. This stands in marked contrast to the detailed weapons inventories and military rosters kept by organized armed forces, though it is hardly surprising in light of the spontaneous nature of military organization during this period.

An estimation of weapons possessed by the militias can, however, be tabulated on the basis of their estimated size and an understanding of patterns of weapons distribution among ex-combatants. The survey administered among ex-combatants in Brazzaville generated a data-set on weapons holding patterns that was projected, with adjustments for selection bias, throughout the country. This approach assumes that distribution patterns are held constant throughout the country and does not account for redistribution within and between militias. In this way, it yields an upper threshold of approximately 39,000 weapons currently circulating in Congo (see Figure 8, below).

Weapons distribution. The survey of 240 ex-combatants in Brazzaville reflects a distribution of weapons holdings broken down by militia and the size of individual holdings. In order to project these results throughout the country and permit a more realistic appraisal of prevailing conditions, these results were adjusted to favour a larger number of small individual holdings while retaining the overall proportions or patterns of weapons possession. This yields a pattern of weapons possession that can be considered broadly representative of the reality throughout the country (see Figure 7). In order to account for those ex-combatants not in possession of weapons, a further adjustment of 20 per cent was applied in order to capture the likely proportion of ex-combatants who either abandoned—or never acquired—a weapon (see note on methodology, above).



Calculating overall weapons possession today. The research team first adjusted the average estimated size of each militia for the percentage assumed not to possess weapons (20 per cent). The number of weapons possessed by armed combatants was then calculated by multiplying the proportions possessing caches of 1, 2–5, 6–10, and 11+ weapons respectively by the average ratio of weapons to combatants calculated for each cache size. This yields a total estimated figure of 69,000 weapons possessed by ex-combatants at the end of hostilities in 1999. Adjusting this figure for the percentage lost or destroyed—20 per cent—and the total number collected by the government, CDS, and UNDP/IOM Programme yields an estimated total of 39,000 weapons currently in the possession of ex-combatants (see Figure 8). A full description of the calculations for these and lower and upper threshold figures can be found in Annex 6.

Figure 8. Estimated number of weapons possessed by ex-combatants

Militia	Total militia size	Armed combatants	Weapons (1999)	Adj weapons destroyed	Adj weapons collected
Cobra	13,200	10,600	26,000	20,500	14,500
Ninja	7,200	5,800	13,000	10,500	8,300
Cocoye	10,800	8,600	30,000	24,000	21,700
Totals	31,200	25,000	69,000	55,000	39,000 *

* Not including 4,500 weapons collected by the government that cannot be identified with specific militias.

Section 3: Distribution of Militia Holdings post-1999

Objective

Generate a geographic profile of current individual ex-combatant holdings and centralized militia caches and the distribution of SALW among militias.


The 41,000 weapons estimated to be in the possession of militias are at present scattered throughout the country. As a result of progress in the peace process to date, the vast majority of these weapons are not openly carried by their owners but instead stored in caches whose size varies from small individual to large collective holdings. Geographically, weapons are concentrated near the areas where they were first acquired or last used. Demographically, weapons are unevenly distributed among ex-combatants, with some possessing large individual holdings and others none. Findings indicate that significant concentrations of weapons are located in Brazzaville, throughout the region of Pool, and in key urban centres in the regions of Niari, Lekoumou, and Bouenza. In the northern regions of Congo, anecdotal evidence suggests that overall quantities are small and concentrated in the towns of Impfondo, Owando, and the environs of Oyo.

Drawing on the results of a mass survey administered in Brazzaville and the interior, as well as a series of field trips to different regions, this section first highlights general and militia-specific trends and patterns in weapons distribution, and then presents in-depth analyses for the main regions covered by the study.

General trends and patterns of weapons distribution

Weapons retention rates. Data from Brazzaville and regions visited by the research team revealed that, on average, a high rate of weapons retention by ex-combatants prevailed throughout the country. Notwithstanding ex-combatants no longer possessing weapons, the general trend observed was the possession of more than one individual weapon and a significant number of medium-size individual caches. Although weapons retention rates vary considerably between militias (as is discussed below), these trends (represented in Figure 9) clearly highlight the dimensions and scope of individual and collective weapons retention.

Geographic and demographic distribution of weapons. Weapons available in Congo are not evenly distributed throughout the country or among ex-combatants, but instead ‘clustered’ or concentrated in particular locales and groups. Geographically, weapons tend to be concentrated in or near areas where they were originally looted or distributed—weapons depots, for instance—or where they were last used. Predictably, heavier weapons were frequently left at the ‘front’ and lighter weapons taken with ex-combatants to their homes and villages. Demographically, an unequal distribution prevails, with some ex-combatants possessing few or no weapons and others possessing significant individual caches ranging from two to ten (or more) weapons. This is primarily the result of uncontrolled or spontaneous weapons acquisition on a ‘first come, first served’ basis.



Weapons caches. Weapons are stored in three main types of caches. The first include small individual holdings of between one and five weapons that are usually wrapped in nylon and burlap sacks or cloths and buried in the homes of ex-combatants. The second include medium-sized individual holdings of between five and ten weapons, usually owned or controlled by former militia unit commanders and established either following the end of the 1999 conflict or in anticipation of a weapons collection operation. Finally, the third type of cache (found exclusively in Pool region) consists of large collective holdings ranging between 100 and 400 weapons owned by several militia units or groups and controlled by their commanders. These, in contrast to the others, are located in urban and rural settings, and are usually well-maintained.

Types of weapons in circulation. The vast majority of weapons currently in the possession of ex-combatants are small arms, machine guns, grenade-launchers, and small mortars. This is a reflection both of the nature of warfare (close combat in urban settings) and the level of training (which was very poor given the low or negligible number of trained combatants). Moreover, what heavy weapons did exist, including artillery pieces, large mortars, and heavy cannons, were often destroyed or abandoned by retreating forces. The main types of weapons observed by the research team included a range of Communist-bloc systems—predominantly AK-47 assault rifles and SKS rifles, but also RPD/RPK GPMGs, 12.7 and 14.5 mm HMGs, RPG 7 and 18), and a variety of foreign assault rifles including the Israeli Galil and South African Vector R4/R5 (see Annex 9 for detailed descriptions of sighted weapons).

Page 18

Weapons ‘turnover’ in the conflict period. Over the course of the three conflicts that took place in Congo, there was a significant turnover or recycling of weapons between militias. Combatants acquired significant amount of weapons, from opposing sides from captured and killed opponents, raiding weapons depots and stockpiles, and disarming opponents at the numerous ‘bouchons’ (check-points) throughout the country. In addition, significant quantities of weapons were also lost or destroyed following military defeats.

Weapons storage. In Congo at least 50 per cent of the weapons stored are simply wrapped in sacks and buried, resulting in a high rate of attrition. In such circumstances it is likely that after a comparatively short time the weapon will become unusable due to rust, a condition accelerated by the heavy rainy season. The first area likely to be affected is the trigger group, which is a delicate and finely manufactured mechanism. It is prone to rust and will rapidly become a solid unmoving lump. At this point the weapon is unusable. From observation of the weapons collected by the UNDP/IOM Programme, approximately 30–50 per cent will not function properly due to lack of care and maintenance. In this light, the longer weapons remained cached the less chance that they will be usable when they are recovered.

Militia-specific distribution patterns

Cobra militia. Most Cobra ex-combatants are at present concentrated in Brazzaville, with smaller numbers located in key urban centres of the northern regions. In Brazzaville, the uncontrolled looting of weapons in 1997 has resulted in a high concentration of individual weapons possession near or around the military depots in the district of Talangai. Current distribution reflects this method of acquisition, with the majority of ex-combatants possessing an average of three weapons per person. In contrast to the Ninja and Cocoye militias, who possessed a certain degree of organizational coherence and hence control over weapons stocks, there has been no control over Cobra weapons possession. As a result, there are few collective or medium-sized caches, and the majority of their owners are youth with no military training or experience. Despite the integration of an estimated 6,500 Cobra ex-combatants into police and military structures, the numbers of weapons suspected to be cached in Brazzaville is extremely high given the tendency of the former to maintain their personal caches.

Finally, and in contrast to the other militias, Cobra ex-combatants experienced little fighting in 1998–99 due to the reliance of the government on the reconstituted FAC and foreign forces; consequently, there was little weapons turnover or redistribution during this conflict due to the capturing of weapons by opposing sides. Most holdings, therefore, are presumed to date from the 1997 conflict.

Cocoye militia. The distribution of weapons among Cocoye ex-combatants is more varied due to the relative cohesion of the militias in the 1997 and 1998–99 conflicts. During the former the Cocoye were organized as a paramilitary formation dependent on the presidency for weapons and orders, while in the latter its transformation into a typical guerrilla movement imposed a classic cell structure on organization and operations. Current weapons distribution patterns consist of a variety of cache sizes ranging from small individual to large collective holdings, and a markedly uneven distribution of weapons among ex-combatants. The widespread distribution of weapons by the Lissouba regime in Brazzaville and throughout the regions of Bouenza, Lekoumou, and Niari has resulted in a high level of weapons availability throughout the area, particularly in urban areas that were scenes of fighting. Overall quantities acquired during the conflict period, however, were reduced by military defeats in 1997—where a large percentage of weapons held in Brazzaville were captured by the Ninja—and 1998–99.

Ninja militia. The vast majority of Ninja ex-combatants are at present concentrated in the region of Pool, and in particular in villages around key urban centres along the railway line linking Brazzaville and Pointe Noire. Despite an anarchic and uncontrolled manner of acquiring weapons throughout the conflict period, and the division of the militia due to the breaking away of a faction controlled by the Reverend Pasteur Ntoumi, the Ninja possess a high degree of centralized control over weapons cached following the last conflict. The majority of weapons possessed by Ninja ex-combatants are suspected to be grouped in large collective caches of between 100 and 400 weapons and located in urban as well as rural settings. Many ex-combatants are no longer in immediate control of weapons, but a significant proportion still retain a minimum of one weapon, ostensibly for self-defence.

Note on Methodology (2)

In order to assess the distribution of weapons among ex-combatants, the research team utilized two methodological approaches. In Brazzaville a large-scale survey-questionnaire on individual holdings was administered to a sample of 240 ex-combatants. A smaller survey-questionnaire was also administered in Niari region to a sample of 35 ex-combatants. The second technique consisted of a series of semi-structured interviews, focus group interviews, and PRA exercises conducted both in Brazzaville and the regions visited by the research team.


The survey. The large-scale survey on individual weapons holdings was administered to a sample of ex-combatants drawn from all three militias. The questionnaire used in the survey was designed to obtain information on pre-1999 as well as current weapons holdings—broken down by weapons types and quantities—to highlight differences. Respondents were also asked to account for differences in current and previous holdings— (i.e., whether they were destroyed, sold, or surrendered—and to identify locations and contents of weapons caches. See Annex 2 for a copy of the questionnaire.

Of the 240 ex-combatants surveyed in Brazzaville, 118 were from the Cobra militia, 63 were from the Cocoye militia, while 59 were from the Ninja militia. Ex-combatant facilitators were trained and hired to administer the questionnaires throughout the city. Although the sample utilized was not, strictly speaking, randomly selected or necessarily representative of the total population, a fair degree of randomness and representativeness was ensured by using a large number of questionnaire administrators and instructing them to cover the broadest demographic and geographic area possible. Nonetheless a certain degree of recall and selection bias cannot be ruled out, though measures to minimize its effects were implemented, including: the selection of questionnaire administrators—some of whom had no relation to the UNDP/IOM Programme; careful review of each completed questionnaire; and the administration of a portion of the questionnaire by the research team itself. Moreover, the research team verified the authenticity and reliability of the results by conducting a series of 15 random interviews per questionnaire administrator. Approximately 60 questionnaires were disqualified as a result, while the others proved to be authentic.

Interviews and PRA. SSIs, focus group interviews, and PRA exercises were conducted with a large number of individuals and groups at all research locations. The objectives of these exercises was to obtain information on the history of weapons proliferation and acquisition, the structure and organization of militia structures, distribution of ex-combatants today, current weapons holdings, types of weapons retained, and the current size of caches. Informants were also asked to discuss current security conditions.

Ex-combatants and weapons in Brazzaville

Following the conflicts of 1997 and 1998–99, most Cocoye and Ninja ex-combatants fled Brazzaville for the interior. As a result, the vast majority of ex-combatants in Brazzaville today are Cobras, usually natives of the city. Cobra ex-combatants are concentrated in the northern districts of Brazzaville, notably Talangai, Ouenze, and MOUNGALI. This distribution is reflected in the UNDP/IOM beneficiary (actual and potential) lists, in which approximately 69 per cent are Cobra, four per cent are Cocoye, 18 per cent are Ninja, and ten per cent are unidentified.³³



Since 1999, Cocoye and Ninja ex-combatants have begun to trickle into Brazzaville—and in particular the districts of Makélékélé and Bacongo—usually in search of employment or in order to enter the UNDP/IOM Programme. No precise information exists on the exact population size, although anecdotal evidence seems to indicate that these groups number in their hundreds.


Demographic profile: Alarmingly, survey results show a high rate—approximately 15 per cent—of child combatants—those individuals who were 18 or younger at the time of the 1998–99 conflict. Of this total, 19 per cent of Cobra were children, 17 per cent of Cocoye, and two per cent of Ninja. All of the ex-combatants surveyed were male (see Figure 10).

Weapons distribution patterns in Brazzaville. In Congo, the distribution of weapons is determined by the size and dispersion of weapons caches, which in turn are a product of how the weapons were originally distributed during the conflicts and the degree of cohesion within militia structures. In Brazzaville weapons are predominantly held in small individual caches—two to five weapons—usually buried in the home of the owner, while a small minority have been collected in larger caches by unit commanders for either resale or delivery to the UNDP/IOM Programme. While most of the Cobra weapons are kept in caches in Brazzaville, most of the Cocoye and Ninja caches are located in their home regions.

During the conflict of 1997, Cobra militia members acquired the majority of their weapons through the looting of military depots and a chaotic distribution of purchased weapons. As a result, many individuals obtained more than one weapon which, following the end of the conflicts, they buried in their

backyards or that of a friend or relative. Hence, the vast majority of Cobra caches in Brazzaville in 1999 were individually owned and dispersed throughout the northern districts. On-site inspections of several individual caches reveal that for the most part they are buried in nylon sacks and are in very poor condition. The survey conducted for this study reveals that the majority (60 per cent) of ex-combatants possess caches of two to five weapons for a ratio of approximately three weapons per person, or 50 per cent of the total amount.³⁴ In contrast, 23 per cent of Cobra ex-combatants possess a single weapon. The distribution of Cobra weapons according to cache size and ownership is represented in Figure 11. The vast majority (93 per cent) of Cobra caches are located in Brazzaville homes.


Figure 11. Distribution of Cobra caches by ownership and Size



Page 22

While most Cobra ex-combatants possessed individual holdings of two to five weapons, weapons distribution among Cocoye ex-combatants is more uneven, with 14 per cent possessing a single weapon, 46 per cent possessing two to five weapons, and a further 22 per cent possessing 11 or more weapons (see Figure 11). This latter raises the possibility—subsequently confirmed by the data on Lekoumou and Bouenza—that the Cocoyes have a larger number of collective caches than the Cobra. The ratios of weapons to individuals is relatively consistent with findings among the Cobra, as indicated in Figure 14. In contrast to the Cobra, however, the vast majority (66 per cent) of identified caches are not located in Brazzaville but are buried in their homes in villages in Niari, Lekoumou, and Bouenza regions.³⁵ This is in itself an important indicator of weapons distribution among the Cocoye in the interior.

Figure 12. Distribution of Cocoye caches by ownership and size



The Ninjas surveyed for this study possessed for the most part caches of one weapon only (68 per cent of population surveyed), and 29 per cent possessed individual caches of two to five weapons (see Figure 13). In addition, UNDP/IOM beneficiary data reveals that nearly 50 per cent of Ninjas who entered the project were reintegrated without surrendering a weapon. Although not represented in the survey, this indicates that many Ninjas in Brazzaville currently do not possess a weapon, and that those who do predominantly possess a single weapon. Approximately 60 per cent of the weapons possessed by the surveyed population were buried in Brazzaville, while the remaining 40 per cent were buried in villages throughout Pool region.

Figure 13. Distribution of Ninja caches by ownership and size




Figure 14. Ratio of weapons to individuals, per cache size group

Militia	Size of weapons cache			
	1	2-5	6-10	11+
Cobra	1	3	7.4	14.1
Ninja	1	3.5	7.2	13.8
Cocoye	1	2.8	6	-

Current availability of weapons in Brazzaville. Between 1999 and 2001, weapons collection efforts were undertaken throughout the country by the CDS, Ministries of Interior and Defence—mainly cash buy-backs—and the UNDP/IOM Programme. Of the 118 Cobras surveyed for this study, 53 per cent disposed of weapons by throwing them away, selling them, or giving them up, for a total of 35 per cent of the stock originally possessed. Of the 63 Cocoyes surveyed for this study, more than 70 per cent disposed of weapons for a total of 38 per cent of the original stock. Finally, of the Ninjas surveyed, more than 20 per cent disposed of their weapons, for a total of 21 per cent of the original stock. Interestingly, those ex-combatants who did dispose of their weapons for the most part retained approximately half of their original stocks. This indicates that the ex-combatants targeted to date have not been fully disarmed.

Survey results also indicate that approximately half of the Cobra ex-combatants who disposed of their weapons sold them, while the other half surrendered them to either the UNDP/IOM Programme or CDS. Cocoye respondents who disposed of their weapons, on the other hand, surrendered approximately 90 per cent and either destroyed (or lost) another nine per cent. This is indicative of the tendency of Cocoyes to migrate to Brazzaville for the express purpose of surrendering their weapons to the UNDP/IOM Programme. This is further borne out by the observation that, of the total surrendered, more than 70 per cent were given to the UNDP/IOM Programme. This pattern is also reflected among Ninja respondents who disposed of weapons. According to survey results, more than 85 per cent of these were weapons surrendered.

Ex-combatants and weapons in the region of Pool

Throughout the conflicts of the 1990s, the region of Pool was for the most part under the control of the Ninja militia. Although the Ninja originated as a predominantly urban phenomenon in Brazzaville, their self-proclaimed identity as 'southerners' or 'Lari' drew rural youth of the same affiliation from throughout Pool. As a result, during the 1997 and 1998–99 conflicts the force size of the militias swelled from an urban hard core to include youth from most of the districts of Pool region. Anecdotal estimates of the size of the Ninja range from 20,000 to 36,000, while adjusted UNDP/IOM data provide an estimated average of 6,000 combatants. During the last conflict, a split developed within the Ninja leadership hierarchy, resulting in the violent separation of the 'Nsiloulou' under the Reverend Pasteur Ntoumi from the main group. Sources from the Ntoumi faction claim they number 15,000, though other sources state the number is closer to 1,000–2,000 ex-combatants.



Following the end of the 1997 and 1998–99 conflicts, most Ninja combatants from Brazzaville dispersed into Pool region. These, together with the combatants originally deployed there, are now concentrated in villages surrounding towns on the railway line and in the triangle of territory around the towns of Kindamba, Mayama, and Vindza. While Ninjas of the Ntoumi faction are predominantly concentrated in the latter area, they are also found in smaller numbers around the towns of Kinkembo and Mindouli, usually for trading purposes. Ninjas not belonging to the Ntoumi faction are clustered in the villages around the towns of Kinkala and Mindouli and the smaller railway towns of Matoumbo and Misafou. There are apparently no Ninja ex-combatants in the eastern or southern-most districts of Pool due to the absence of fighting there. There are few Ninjas in the towns themselves, which are heavily militarized government enclaves. Most of the towns have yet to regain their pre-war population levels as many inhabitants still reside in neighbouring villages. Although an uneasy truce exists between ex-combatants dispersed throughout the countryside and military authorities in the towns, the latter are usually sites of great tension, as the incidents in Mindouli in April 2001 demonstrate.

Weapons distribution patterns. Many of the weapons currently in Pool region are originally from Brazzaville and other regions. In addition to the weapons looted from local police and military installations throughout the entire conflict period, many weapons were brought into the region by Ninja combatants fleeing Brazzaville in 1997—although an estimated 20–30 per cent of these weapons were dumped into the river outside Brazzaville. Other weapons were acquired by disarming Cocoye combatants as they too fled Brazzaville at the end of the 1997 conflict. The distribution of these weapons largely follows the pattern of ex-combatant settlement in the region, that is, in locales near the railway lines and outside major towns.

In contrast to the other militias, the Ninjas maintained a cohesive organizational structure that managed to survive the 1998 internal rift and that continued into the post-conflict period. The relatively high degree of organization is reflected in the degree of centralized control exerted over weapons. Following the end of the 1998–99 conflict, unit commanders (*chefs d'écurie*) gathered weapons from

their troops and placed them in large caches located in villages and towns throughout Pool region. According to several sources, the majority of Ninja weapons were cached in this manner, although an estimated 20 per cent of ex-combatants still retain individual holdings. Moreover, an estimated 20 per cent of ex-combatants were issued machetes instead of military weapons due to their perceived inability to handle the latter.³⁸

These assertions are borne out by information on collective caches obtained during a visit to Pool region. Thirteen caches were identified in the vicinity of Kinkala and Mindouli, accounting for 2,308 weapons. The size of the caches ranged from 40 to 400 weapons, with an average cache size of 178 weapons. The caches identified also revealed a consistently high ratio of 3.9 weapons per combatant (for full details on Ninja caches, see Annex 8). Most caches identified primarily consist of assault rifles—Kalashnikovs and South African Vectors—grenades, RPGs and heavy machine guns (12.7mm). The assertion that not all Ninjas deposited weapons in collective caches is borne out by key-informant interviews and the survey data from Brazzaville, which reveals that a number of ex-combatants either have been disarmed or possess at least a single weapon.³⁹ The prevalence of large caches might also explain the relatively high number of ex-combatants who present themselves at the UNDP/IOM Programme without weapons.

The research team was unable to ascertain whether the pattern of weapons distribution among the Ninja in Kinkala and Mindouli is similar or identical to that of the Ntoumi faction. Due to the high tension prevailing in Kindamba and Mayama, the high level of discipline and secrecy among Ntoumi ex-combatants, and a general reluctance to acknowledge weapons possession, most of the individuals and unit commanders interviewed claimed not to possess weapons.⁴⁰ When pressed, however, one unit commander admitted that, although a certain amount of weapons were collected and given to Ntoumi—who subsequently surrendered a portion to the government—many ex-combatants retained individual weapons for self-defence.⁴¹ Hence it is possible to infer that the Ntoumi faction in all likelihood possess a small number of large collective caches and a widespread distribution of individually-held weapons.

Ex-combatants and weapons in Niari, Bouenza, and Lekoumou

Between 1993 and 1997, the then president, Pascal Lissouba, recruited youths to create the Cocoye, a militia force directly subordinate to the Presidency. The ex-combatants that make up the Cocoye are concentrated primarily in the regions of Niari, Bouenza, Lekoumou, and throughout the southern and western districts of Brazzaville. The ‘imagined’ heartland of the Cocoye is in Niari—and in particular the town of Mossendjo, near the home of former President Lissouba. It was in Mossendjo that the military and political wings of the Cocoye and Ninja were consolidated in 1999, and where Lissouba’s Conseil National de Resistance (CNR) was based.⁴²

Discussions with Cocoye unit commanders and ex-combatants indicate that the militia was composed of approximately 2,000 trained hard-core ex-combatants and up to an alleged 30,000 ‘self-appointed’ fighters. Immediately prior to the ‘popular uprising’ of January 1999, the Cocoye identity was appropriated by large numbers of youth from Northern Niari and Dolisie—and became a rallying call in defiance to the occupying forces—e.g. Angolans and ex-Cobra under Sassou). Importantly, civilians became combatants under the umbrella of the Cocoye⁴³. Indeed, people continue to identify themselves as (former) Cocoye, whether or not they participated directly in armed confrontations or not. This concern with definitions has practical implications, particularly when rendering estimations of the number of ex-combatants.⁴⁴






Figure 15. Weapons distribution patterns in Niari



This phenomenon can be explained by a chain of armed confrontations in the region leading to the explosive environment or ‘popular uprising’ in 1999. These began with armed confrontations in April 1998—the 45 day war in Bouenza—escalated in Pool during September 1998 and December 1998 (i.e. BZV, Pool, and Bouenza, Lekoumou) and exploded in Niari on 25 January 1999. In Brazzaville, discrimination against Cocoye combatants, and their concerns with the levels of violence back in their villages, lead to the progressive return home. Following the widespread arming of the civilian population in January 1999, the transition from consolidated militia to armed popular civil resistance was complete.

As government forces progressively gained the advantage along the fronts in the region, Cocoye combatants retreated towards Niari, and in particular its frontier towns. Nyanga, for instance, was flooded by a large proportion of heavily armed youth, mostly via Mossendjo—with their weapons—and en route to Gabon. Many reportedly stayed in Nyanga for an extended period or permanently, while others joined the large numbers of refugees that crossed into Gabon.⁴⁵ Subsequently this exodus has begun to reverse itself, with significant numbers of ex-Cocoyes returning from their self-imposed exile, and returning to their home districts. Cocoye in the regions of Lekoumou and Bouenza remain for the most part concentrated in urban centres, and in particular the towns that were centres of resistance during the conflict—in particular Dolisie, Loudima, Mouyoundzi, and Sibiti. In contrast to the Ninjas—and in particular the Ntoumi faction—the Cocoye political and military structure have largely disintegrated, though pockets or nodes of organized clandestine groups might still exist.

Weapons distribution patterns. The Cocoye have been characterized as ‘political individuals’ who make up their own minds and take individual decisions. This pattern of individualism was observed amongst the Cocoye ex-militia members interviewed. Given this social awareness and individuality the cell structure adopted by the Cocoye resistance movement, CNR, between 1998 and the outbreak of civil war in 1999 was perfectly tailored to capitalize on this characteristic. It was also a classic example of the guerilla cell structure and the separation of political and military wings very closely resembles the relationship between Sinn Fein and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). With this background one would expect to see a pattern of individual weapon ownership, and small caches under local control, rather than a highly centralized pattern of large collective caches, such as those of the Ninja reflecting their much more centrist organization and *modus operandi*.



Survey results, key informant interviews, and inspections of caches reveal that in Bouenza, Lekoumou, and Niari, the majority of weapons in ex-combatant hands are widely and unevenly distributed in small individual or group caches whose size varies widely (see Figures 15 and 16). Assault rifles—AK47s, Galils, and Vector R4/R5s—are the most common weapons types, along with RPGs. These findings correlate with patterns of weapon holding in Brazzaville, hence complementing findings on the latter. According to local sources in Bouenza and Lekoumou, most ex-combatants possess small individual caches of one to five weapons in houses and near villages. The weapons contained in these caches, according to the same sources, are usually ‘mercenary-type’ weapons—i.e. Galils, Vector R4/R5s, G3s—and not standard FAC issue—AK47s, SKS rifles.⁴⁶

In contrast to Cobra ex-combatants, whose weapons are mainly found in small individual holdings, group—or large individual—caches are fairly common among the Cocoye, ranging from five to 20 to battalion-size caches—approximately 80 weapons. This is a function of the higher degree of military organization among the Cocoye and of how the weapons were originally procured.⁴⁷ It is unknown how many group caches exist. Most are stored in relatively poor conditions, either in personal residences above ground or wrapped and concealed below ground.⁴⁸ Estimates of the proportion of weapons maintained in group caches, based on group interviews and survey data, range from ten per cent to 30 per cent. Most are located in urban areas that witnessed significant fighting. This corroborates the finding that that most weapons remained close to where they were used.




Weapons in weapons cache.

Although Cocoye weapons caches are widely dispersed both geographically and among ex-combatants, the ability of their owners to mobilize them to some common purpose should not be underestimated. One researcher was shown the contents of three caches, approximately six weapons, and a selection of ammunition for them that had been collected, within the space of a few hours. A second Cocoye cache consisted of three general purpose and heavy machine guns—German G3s and a Chinese copy of an SGM— complete with ammunition, two RPG 7 launchers, and three assault rifles. These indicate that an attempt had been made to gather ‘battle-winning’ assets into one cache. One might speculate that this was an écurie cache, possibly under the control of the écurie commander, the foot soldiers of the group being responsible for providing and looking after their own arms. A final large cache identified through the survey consisted of 60 Kalashnikovs, 12 RPGs, 15 SKS rifles, and 70 grenades. This cache, located in the village of Louvakou, indicates the existence of battalion-size caches that were deposited at the end of the last conflict.

Weapons used by, and collected from, the Cocoye include: Kalashnikov rifles, 12.7mm and 14.5mm HMGs, GPMGs (RPD and RPK), under-barrel grenade launchers (PM Castors), rocket-propelled grenade launchers, SKS rifles, mortars, portable mortars, grenades, and ammunition (from Mbouti, Dolisie, and the centre de formation). Moreover, Bulgarian AKS-47s with effaced serial numbers—the typical weapon obtained by Cobra forces in 1997—were apparently taken from ambushed Angolan soldiers in Niari. The larger crew-served weapons, such as 12.7mm and 14.5mm HMGs, are heavy to carry and difficult to hide. From interviews, it appears that such weapons were kept at the front and manned by relief crews. Thus, at the cessation of hostilities, as the Cocoye structure disintegrated and a *sauve qui peut* attitude predominated, one would expect such heavy weapons to be abandoned at their point of last use. Fleeing Cocoye militia would carry one or two individual weapons as a personal insurance policy.

These would be subsequently hidden at, or close to, their final stop. Furthermore, according to virtually all Cocoye interviewed, most heavy weapons were 'collected' from the communities through repeated clandestine and frequently unannounced buy-back programmes administered through the CDS—that is, between CFA 25,000 and 500,000 depending on the weapon type. The UNDP/IOM programme also collected a number of 'light weapons'—though many Cocoye claim to still possess their own personal weapon.



Section 4: Small Arms Proliferation and Trade in the Republic of Congo

Objective

Assess current SALW proliferation in the RoC—in-country and trans-border movements—through the identification of key transit points and the market structure—prices, sources and buyers, and commodity value of SALW—in urban centres.

Studies in Africa have shown that porous borders and regional patterns of instability and conflict create favourable conditions for markets in surplus military weapons that are recycled from one conflict zone to another (Small Arms Survey, 2001). The saturation of society with such weapons, the lack of centralized control over their distribution, and the corresponding low price, mean that large volumes of these weapons can circulate between countries in short periods of time. The situation of Congo-Brazzaville—a country glutted with weaponry and surrounded by countries experiencing conflict or severe political and social instability—would at first glance imply the existence of a thriving weapons market and large weapons movements in the region. The reality, however, is surprisingly different. Although unable to acquire precise data on the magnitudes or volumes of weapons movements, the research team was able to ascertain that cross-border trade is being conducted on a small—almost negligible—scale. Instead, internal demand has created a domestic market for weapons throughout Congo.

The environment. The Republic of Congo shares its frontiers with Gabon, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire), and the Cabinda enclave of Angola. Each of these countries has experienced significant political instability or armed conflict and a corresponding deterioration in the capacity of state agencies to monitor and regulate the illegal trade in weapons and other smuggled goods. This situation is compounded by poor or non-existent surveillance infrastructure. Air traffic control in the region, for instance, is rudimentary and does not extend beyond the international airports. Moreover, borders are difficult to police or secure since many of them run through dense tropical forest. Finally, the region is noted for the endemic corruption of many officials and civil servants, particularly in the seaports and airports. This combination of factors has thus created a favourable environment for the free circulation of weapons within and across borders.

Extensive interviews with ex-combatants, former unit commanders, local authorities, diplomatic sources, and arms dealers based in the United Kingdom permitted an assessment of key transit points and market structure for the cross-border trade in weapons, as well as the dynamics, modalities, and structure of internal trade and redistribution. With regard to the former, a small-scale covert trade exists between RoC and DRC, organized by networks that funnel weapons across the Congo river between Brazzaville and Impfondo, and fuelled by the continuing warfare in the latter. The domestic market for weapons is driven by two sources of demand. First, it is evident that there is some degree of non-monetary redistribution of weapons occurring in urban centres—primarily in the form of consolidated weapons caches—and an embryonic market for weapons involving both ex-combatants and civilians. Second, military weapons are being sold to individuals residing around or near nature and wildlife reserves for the purpose of poaching. Although an assessment of the magnitude or volume of weapons sold in these different ways requires further in-depth study, information received indicates that such trade is not significant in comparison with the total quantities of weapons believed to be in circulation, despite the favourable environment.

What's in a Price?

In stable economies prices are important indicators of the nature of supply and demand for goods and services, and the dynamics of the market as a whole. In the Republic of Congo, prices of military weapons being sold on the black market vary significantly between regions. Although this market is undoubtedly distorted by different factors—including high transaction costs attributable to the lack of easy transportation, government intervention, the covert nature of the trade, and low psychological ‘recognition’ of the economic value of weapons—weapons prices nonetheless provide important insights into market structure and nature (see Figure 17).

The absence of a weapons market prior to the conflicts of the 1990s raises the question of how current prices have been determined. In a normal market, a ‘clearing price’ occurs at the intersection of supply and demand. This, however, depends on the availability and easy transmission of market information, which does not exist in Congo due to the secrecy and lack of organization surrounding the weapons trade. From this it can be inferred that current prices are a legacy of the weapons buy-back price of 2000—established by the Congolese government—that in essence set a (very low) baseline for the market value of weapons. This stands in distinction to other contexts, such as Mozambique or Afghanistan, where low prices are a function of a market clearing in a context of near-perfect information (e.g. arms bazaars). The prices in Congo by and large reflect the government prices, indicating not only a distorted market, but also one that is not structured to ensure that supply and demand are satisfied. The only exceptions are Brazzaville, Cabinda, and possibly Impfondo, where higher prices illustrate an increasing gradient due to the proximity of the sources of demand and supply.

Page 32

Table 17: Estimated market values of weapons in the region

Type	Price (USD)	Local price (CFA)
Weapons buy-back price (Government)	20-30	15,000-25,000
Street Price in Brazzaville (RoC)	40-67	15,000-25,000
Street Price in Sibiti (RoC)	13-27	10,000-20,000
Street Price in Dolisie (RoC)	27-33	20,000-25,000
Street price in Cabinda (Angola)	33	25,000
Street price in Kinshasa (DRC)	200	150,000

Cross-border trade in weapons

Weapons to DRC: The Congo river forms a permeable boundary between the RoC and DRC that permits the easy transport of goods and people and serves as a vital economic artery. In the DRC fighting between rebel groups and the government in Kinshasa has been raging for several years, generating a constant demand for weaponry and ammunition. In order to service this demand, traders and dealers from DRC cross the Congo river to purchase weapons in RoC where, as has been made clear, abundant supplies are available. According to numerous recorded testimonies and eye-witness accounts, the majority of weapons are purchased in Brazzaville, Impfondo, and at several key locations along the river including Makotiboko and Bolobo, in the region of Plateaux. These weapons are for the most part destined for the rebel group led by Bemba in north-west Congo, and unknown elements in Brazzaville.

Information received indicates that, in Brazzaville at least, this trade is not conducted on a large and organized scale but rather by individuals who, crossing over by pirogue, purchase small numbers of weapons that are subsequently distributed within the interior or sold in Kinshasa for USD 200: four times the price in Brazzaville. These individuals are allegedly part of a larger network operating

throughout the city and its environs, but its size is not at present known. The relatively small number of weapons being sold in this manner is explained by the presence of a joint patrol force deployed along the Congo river and strict security measures in Kinshasa. These could effectively be deterring a larger trade from developing.

Along the river and in Impfondo the situation is reportedly much different. The road between Brazzaville and Owando is for the most part paved, and a well-known pipeline for weapons being sold domestically. Weapons from Brazzaville and the environs—for example, Mossaka, where large quantities were stocked as a rear base for Sassou in Oyo—are also sold at key river-bank locations to DRC dealers. Sources claim Impfondo is a major trade hub for weapons due to its proximity to Bemba's forces and the nature and wildlife reserve of Lac Télé. Many weapons have been reportedly stocked throughout the region of Likouala, and there are a considerable number of DRC combatants who cross over to purchase weapons, either individually or as a group.⁴⁹ Lack of time unfortunately prevented the verification of these assertions.

Weapons to Gabon: In addition to the DRC, weapons are also being sold across the border in Gabon, Chad, and the Cabinda enclave of Angola. The Gabon trade has a history, though, as ex-combatants were reportedly selling weapons in Gabon between 1997 and 1999. This trade was, and reportedly still is, conducted from locations in the regions of Niari and Lekoumou, although the principal purchasers are poachers on both sides of the border.⁵⁰ This led to soured relations and eventual intervention from the Gabonese authorities.

Trade with Angola: Another key transit point is the border between Congo and the Cabinda enclave of Angola. This is an open border with free-flowing trade and traffic in both directions. On-site visits revealed that a thriving market in the sale and purchase of light weapons exists in the area. According to dealers encountered, the price for a Kalashnikov assault rifle throughout the region lies in the range of USD 13–20 (F CFA 10,000–15,000), depending on the quantity purchased.

The assessment of the cross-border trade in weapons reveals a pattern of small-time weapons dealers whose activities are not organized or parts of larger networks or cartels. To a certain extent, this is due to the dynamics of weapons procurement in the region. In the DRC, rebel movements are in all likelihood similar to the militias in RoC in so far as weapons procurement depends on the initiative and resources of individual units or group commanders. In Angola, the long history of warfare has resulted in semi-professional standing armies with established large-scale procurement strategies and little need for engaging in petty trade. Finally, the dispersed distribution of weapons throughout Congo, together with the prevalence of individual ownership and small caches, renders bulk trading impracticable and most likely logistically impossible to organize.

Internal trade and redistribution of weapons

In addition to weapons sold across borders, current proliferation patterns also include internal movements characterized by two main factors. To begin with, it appears that previous weapons collection efforts, the UNDP/IOM Programme, and expectations of future weapons collection have inadvertently spurred demand for weapons in certain urban centres. These are being redistributed—and sometimes sold—among ex-combatants and 'civilians' in an attempt to gain access to the UNDP/IOM Programme. A related phenomenon is the sale of weapons by foreign forces deployed in RoC for the same purpose.⁵¹ The second characteristic of the internal market for weapons is a significant trade in weapons to poachers located in the vicinity of the national wildlife reserves. Although indicators of the scale or volume of the internal trade are lacking, it is clear that at present more movement of weapons is occurring internally than externally.

Reintegration-driven demand: One of the unintended consequences of the UNDP/IOM reintegration and weapons collection project—and indeed of all voluntary weapons exchange programmes—is the generation of demand for weapons. Although the UNDP/IOM Programme is not a weapons buy-back scheme, the linking of reintegration assistance with weapons collection serves as an incentive for individuals to acquire weapons that are then presented to enter the project. Interviews with ex-combatants in Brazzaville and other regions revealed that a considerable redistribution of weapons takes place among ex-combatants.⁵² Although this redistribution is normally non-monetary in nature, with weapons being loaned or requisitioned by former unit commanders, there is some evidence that weapons are also being sold, usually at the street price.⁵³ The net result of this activity is not only the redistribution of weapons among ex-combatants,⁵⁴ including the consolidation of large caches, but also a steady migration of ex-combatants to project sites.⁵⁵

Demand for poaching weapons: In both rural and urban areas of RoC, weapons are being sold by ex-combatants to alleviate financial burdens and support their families. In particular, there is a strong market for military weapons destined for poaching in the wildlife reserves throughout Congo. Evidence collected in Brazzaville, Lekoumou, and Likouala regions reveals that this trade is widespread and highly profitable due to the low prices of weapons—particularly outside Brazzaville—and the relative impunity with which poachers operate.⁵⁶ Most weapons are reportedly sold directly from Brazzaville—again by Cobra ex-combatants—where they are transported by either pirogues or road to the reserves, or from Impfondo.⁵⁷ Considerable amounts of weapons purchased in Impfondo, for instance, are kept by the inhabitants of the villages surrounding the reserve of Lac Télé. A recent household sweep by police in one of these villages, with a population of 2,000, resulted in the confiscation of 30 assault rifles in one night alone.⁵⁸ From this it can be inferred that the trade in weapons for poaching is not inconsequential, and in all likelihood surpasses the trade connected with the UNDP/IOM Programme. More research in this area should be a priority in order to assess changes in both the frequency and the effects of poaching as a result of the weapons trade since 1999, and the possible existence of organized weapons markets in areas of commercial logging.

Page 34

The small-scale and individually organized nature of the internal weapons trade, like the cross-border trade, suggests that a relatively insignificant quantity of weapons is being transferred or redistributed within the country. The poor condition of the roads in the interior, together with the relatively strict control on movement, makes the transportation of significant quantities of weapons—50 or more—difficult or nearly impossible. From this it can be inferred that the both the internal and the cross-border trade in weapons in Congo, while not insignificant, do not in all likelihood surpass several hundred weapons a year.

The Commodity Value of Weapons

To what extent are military weapons owned by ex-combatants today a commodity like any other in Congo? To a certain extent this is determined by market economics and the roles of supply and demand. The existence of a demand for weapons both internally and externally, and the ready supply to match it, has indeed created a market for weapons, albeit one that is organized and structured at the individual level. In this sense military weapons are a commodity. In addition, to an objective identity and market value as a commodity, however, there is also a psychological dimension—the degree to which owners of weapons consider them as objects that can be bought or sold on a market—which in turn affects the supply available.

One factor that might explain why the trade in weapons is not as large as one would expect is the possibility that many ex-combatants do not consider their weapons as objects with intrinsic economic value. In Congo, weapons were distributed freely and without discrimination, and never had an economic label or price attached. Instead, a weapon transformed its owner into a warrior, ‘courageux’, or figure to be hated and feared. Weapons thus possessed a social value not expressible in financial terms.

Following the end of the war, the social value of weapons, at least for the defeated, was transformed into an instrument of self-defence or a private badge of resistance or defiance. Although weapons were partially ‘commodified’ by the weapons buy-back initiated by the government, the low level of economic activity then and now indicates that no widespread psychological shift has occurred among most ex-combatants. This might explain the anomalous, low level of the weapons trade, but more importantly provide possibilities for collecting weapons without their further commodification.

Section 5: Measuring the Impacts of Small Arms in Congo-Brazzaville

Objective

Identify indicators that might usefully measure the impacts of the weapons collection component on security and well-being. Propose methods to ensure the feasibility of their tracking and develop a tracking methodology.

Is gun violence getting worse in Brazzaville? If it is, what are the impacts of small arms on individuals in Congo-Brazzaville? Why measure the impacts of small arms on communities? What value would a chronological series of impacts criteria add to the UNDP/IOM reintegration and weapons collection project? These questions require critical analysis. First, indicators provide useful benchmarks to measure the impact of an intervention on a given situation. By establishing baseline indicators that measure the impacts of small arms on a society, it becomes possible to identify critical points for intervention that facilitate any justification of programme entry or exit.

When assessing the ‘impacts’ of conventional weapons collection programmes, evaluators have often demonstrated an excessive reliance on physical ‘results’ and ‘outputs’ such as the number of weapons or amount of ammunition collected, the number of weapons destroyed, and so forth. While these are desirable components of any intervention, they can potentially miss the point, particularly in societies that are saturated with weapons and have yet to consolidate a durable peace, like Congo-Brazzaville. More often, qualitative gains—such as perceived security and safety resulting from weapons removal—though difficult to record, are a more appropriate gauge of programme success. The questions are: How do we measure gains in perceived security and safety resulting from weapons removal? Is the UNDP/IOM programme actually contributing to the strengthening of people’s perceptions of security?

If a collection programme is designed to create and foster a sustainable ‘climate of security’, it is often useful to focus on objective and subjective measurements of ‘insecurity’. Security is not singularly determined by the number of weapons in a given society. Indeed, the perceived ‘environment’ has to be such that the resort to weapons is reduced.⁵⁹ That said, reducing the physical availability of illegally acquired weapons remains a vital component of any efforts to generate security. The research team identified three sectors that could usefully and rapidly be explored by the UNDP/IOM Programme: health, crime, and participatory assessments. By measuring temporal changes in these three sectors, the UNDP/IOM initiative could begin to assess the extent to which weapons collection is improving, or not affecting, the overall climate of insecurity in a geographic local.

A question of health: Small arms injuries in Brazzaville


Health indicators are objective: they are comparative, measurable, and quantifiable, and allow analysis. A direct effect of small arms on Congolese citizens is injuries, fatal and non-fatal. An elementary epidemiological finding is that, for every death attributable to small arms, there is a minimum of two or more injuries. Provided some routine survey or surveillance is conducted, these injuries can be analysed over time. In-patient records can be differentiated by sex and age, injury type, and related morbidity. From this perspective, small arms effects can be measured much like any disease constituting a serious threat to health, or an epidemic or public health crisis. It is also possible to measure small arms injuries within a large sample size in Congo-Brazzaville, even in areas of UNDP/IOM intervention.

Recognizing serious time limitations, the research team consulted a range of epidemiologists and medical doctors in Brazzaville to establish the feasibility of a longitudinal study of the impacts of small arms on population health. It was rapidly decided that a quick impact study could be carried out, provided

authorization was received from the Ministry of Health, in the central hospitals of CHU, Makélékélé, and Talangai. The coverage of these three hospitals roughly approximates the ‘intervention’ area of the UNDP/IOM collection programme. Most hospitals and clinics were looted or destroyed during the three conflicts; and this, coupled with significant resource constraints, limited expectations about the quality and consistency of data. Data from 2001 was unavailable because it has yet to be tabulated or registered—though it will become available in January 2002. Indeed, it is remarkable that any archival patient data exists at all. The research team datasets for Talangai, Makélékélé and CHU, while incomplete, illustrate two trends: (1) that reported injuries are concentrated in North Brazzaville; and (2) that injuries are predominantly clustered among young males.

Northern exposure

The first trend must be put in the context of an overall decline in small arms injuries throughout Brazzaville between 1998 and 2000.⁶⁰ Anecdotal information suggests that trends are continuing in this direction for 2001. Relatedly, there is also a notable concentration of injuries in particular districts of Brazzaville. As Figure 18 demonstrates, the overwhelming majority of gunshot-injury patients came from Talangai. Indeed, more than 30 per cent of all injured victims came from this district. This suggests that there is a comparatively more significant problem of small weapons-related violence in the northern districts of Brazzaville. Interestingly, the rate of injury correlates with the findings of the research team and the UNDP/IOM Programme on weapons distribution: the highest number of weapons per household can be found in Talangai. This tentatively suggests a relationship between weapons possession and firearm injury in Brazzaville.



Equally important, even in 2000, there were still significant numbers of injuries occurring throughout the rest of Brazzaville. Though Makélékélé was unable to provide data from 1998, and all small arms injury cases at Talangai were referred to CHU from 2000 onwards, it is clear that firearm injuries were incurred throughout the city. It also relevant that over 98 per cent of all injuries treated were from small arms, and not grenades or mortars. Figure 19 highlights these trends. This suggests that small arms collection programmes should not be concentrated exclusively on Talangai, but should also address other regions. It also indicates that collection programmes should prioritize small arms, though

other forms of armaments remain significant. It should be recalled, however, that many factors condition the rate of injury. Many of these are situational and relate to the number of doctors per unit population, the access of victims to medical facilities—most people actually die before physically getting to the hospital—and the quality of services, treatment, and care.

Figure 19. Geographic distribution of firearm injuries in Brazzaville, 1998–2000

Type of weapon	Districts of Brazzaville/No of cases							
	Makélékélé	Bacongo	Poto Poto	Moungali	Ouenze	Talagai	Mfilou	Grand total
Small arm	131	77	219	238	220	471	21	1,377
Arme blanche	17	8	3	3	2	6	3	42
Grenade	6	3	0	0	1	33	2	45
RPG/mortar	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
RPG/mortar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	154	88	222	241	223	511	26	1,465

Identifying victims

The second trend relates to the impacts of firearm violence on particular demographic sectors of Brazzaville. Examining records drawn from each hospital indicates that males and youth were particularly susceptible to firearm-related injuries between 1998 and 2000. Of the estimated 1,160 injuries reported among men, approximately 25 per cent were less than 20 years old. More than 40 per cent were between the ages of 21 and 30, and more than 25 per cent were over 30. Among women, the largest number of reported firearm injuries were between the ages of 11 and 30. As Figure 20 below shows, the percentage of those injured who were almost certainly civilian casualties—for example, under the age of 10, over the age of 41, and female—is approximately 40 per cent.

Page 38

Figure 20. Demographic distribution of firearm injuries in Congo-Brazzaville, 1998–2000

Type of weapon	Age group/sex										Totals		Grand total
	0-10		11-20		21-30		31-40		41+				
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	
Small Arm	60	35	279	79	490	93	186	41	110	21	1,125	269	1,394
Arme blanche	0	0	6	3	7	2	1	0	3	0	17	5	22
Grenade	6	1	4	2	6	0	1	1	1	0	18	4	22
RPG/mortar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
RPG/mortar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	66	36	289	84	503	95	188	42	114	22	1,160	279	1,439

Rising or declining crime

Criminality can also be measured objectively, whether through firearm homicide rates, incidence of armed assault, armed robbery, intimidation with a weapon, and sexual violence. Other indicators relate to insurance premiums, the number and cost of private insurance companies or services, and forms of emigration. Together, these indicators provide an index of insecurity that is possible to evaluate over time.

In Congo-Brazzaville, the transition from war to relative calm has been accompanied by marked declines in crime—partly as a result of rising perceptions of security, the gradual reduction of a culture of impunity, the restoration of a degree of law and order, and, potentially, the reduction of weapons in society. In Brazzaville and throughout the interior there was, and continues to be, a relatively high incidence of petty crime and rape, though these appear to be nowhere near previous levels. Though attempts to gather data from national police stations, PSPs, and local police officers were frustrated by the lack of authorization from the Ministry of the Interior, it is possible to assess crime rates, by proxy, in Congo-Brazzaville.

Important sources of data are the national print media. *Le Semain Africain*, BBC World News Service, and other media remained operational during the conflict periods and are currently still in print. Archival reviews can reveal general trends and changes in criminality, particularly those criminal activities that involved small arms, both during and following the conflict period. A very preliminary review suggests that criminal activity has not soared in the post-conflict period, as it has in so many other countries recovering from war. Rather, key informants and focus group discussions reveal a general decline in widespread criminality—though reported incidents of weapons use remain common. Other sources of data on criminality can be generated through surveys and focus groups, particularly among affected groups such as young men, women, and children. These data can be generated through both structured and open format. Gathering and analysis should reflect seasonal and demographic trends, the types of weapons used in the incident, and local interpretations of ‘crime’ so as to provide appropriate interventions.

Participatory rural appraisal (PRA) and insecurity

Another area that requires still further investigation relates to ‘perceptions’ of small arms-related insecurity. Though objective data such as firearm injuries and firearm homicide reveal one dimension of the impacts of small arms, there are other, more subjective, indicators of fear. That they are more difficult to measure does not make them any less important in the final analysis. Though time constraints ruled out a nuanced assessment, the research team undertook a series of short, rapid participatory appraisals of people’s perceptions of insecurity in order to test the applicability of PRA.

Exploring the topic of armed violence and its effects demands a relatively strong relationship between the facilitator—i.e. the research team—and the participants—i.e. the target group. It also requires empathy, time, and insight that may or may not be forthcoming in every circumstance. For this reason, participatory assessments of impacts are not recommended in all situations. Where they are effectively prepared, they will provide a relatively rapid and detailed evaluation to complement standard data-collection techniques. A number of proposed participatory tools are included in the figure below, such as semi-structured interviews (SSI), social and economic mapping, time-line drawing, and the like.

One way of generating a profile of how small arms saturation affects the population is to determine the overall context of insecurity—asking them outright ‘what makes you feel insecure?’. By actively engaging a group, whether women, children, or men, or combined groups, it is possible to open a dialogue that will lead, in its own time, to the subject of armed violence. By validating and documenting the perceptions as they emerge, the facilitators can legitimize the opinions and perceptions of the target group. Where possible, efforts should be made to explore the entire range of impacts of weapons-related violence and explore community ‘solutions’ to reducing the availability and use (see Figure 21).

Very provisional participatory exercises were undertaken at various points by the research team. In one session, involving approximately 12 Ninja militia, a range of indicators relating to the ‘impacts of small arms’ included: the predominance of female-heads of households, measured by widows and sin-

gle-mothers; the significant reduction of commercial or trading activity, particularly the number of formal and informal traders; the incidence of theft, indicated by stolen assets and household items; the forceful occupation of abandoned homes; and the incidence of temporary displacement. While incomplete and still requiring further analysis, these indicators suggest a novel approach to assessing firearm-related insecurity that may better address the perceptions and needs of affected populations.

Figure 21. Measuring security indicators in RoC

Research questions	Methods and instruments
Place in context the community perceptions of insecurity.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SSI • Historical time-lines (before and after displacement) • Listing of what makes people 'insecure' • Prioritizing and ranking conditions of insecurity
Understanding the 'types' of violence from a community perspective.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SSI • Listing of types of violence (before and after displacement) • Prioritizing/ranking • Mapping (social, household, resource-use, venn diagrams)
Impacts of armed violence on community life	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SSI • Transect walks and focus-group discussions to triangulate and establish vulnerable groups and focus on particular issues • Listing of types • Brainstorming on criteria for assessment • Trend change, seasonality calendars, cause-impact analysis, etc • Resource inventory and or livelihood analysis • Matrix scoring and ranking of types • Impact diagrams
Community perceptions on possible solutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SSI • Listing options • Pairwise ranking • Problems, opportunity and analysis ranking • Planning and negotiation

Small arms availability and trade in Congo: Policy implications

The widespread availability of small arms in the RoC today illustrates a contemporary phenomenon throughout conflict regions in Africa, and indeed the world. Globalization, the downsizing and privatization of the military sector, and the collapse of communism have combined to create a booming international market for weapons underpinned by plentiful supplies from Cold War-era stockpiles. Advances in information technology, the expansion of the cargo industry, and the global reach of financial networks have catalysed the creation of multinational weapons-trading networks that reach deep into the most volatile and remote conflict zones. Although such activities are for the most part illegal or covert, weak state and regulatory systems in these areas, combined with an inelastic demand, guarantee the availability of a virtually unlimited supply of weapons. The massive diffusion and availability of weapons into Congo is thus a legacy of structural forces whose consequences pose novel challenges in post-conflict contexts.

The study attempted to map out the dynamics of small arms proliferation in Congo as a step to identifying the nature and scope of the problems posed. The hope is that reintegration and weapons collection activities, as strategies to mitigate the consequences of conflict and consolidate economic and social reconstruction, can be better adjusted to the challenges posed by widespread small arms availability.

This section reviews the findings that emerge from the study and highlights several key policy implications. These latter are intended not as an evaluation or critique of the UNDP/IOM Programme to date but rather as practical suggestions that emerge from the study findings themselves.

Page 41


Global estimate of weapons holdings

Although the estimated 41,000 weapons in ex-combatant hands present a significant security threat, the risk is potentially less acute than that experienced in other countries saturated with small arms. In Albania, for instance, more than 650,000 weapons were released into society, to devastating effect. Other examples of small arms proliferation in post-conflict contexts include Mozambique, with an estimated 1.5 million weapons in circulation, and Cambodia, with an estimated 500,000–1 million weapons in circulation. It is reassuring to note, then, that despite intense regional insecurity and the lack of adequate systems to regulate the proliferation and possession of weapons, the RoC has successfully avoided a catastrophic outbreak of social and criminal violence.

Collection targets: The quantity of weapons collected to date through the combined efforts of the RoC government, CDS, and the UNDP/IOM Programme represents approximately 28 per cent—16,000 weapons—of the total available—an estimated 57,000—in late 1999. Of this total, the UNDP/IOM Programme has collected five per cent. The remaining 72 per cent, or 41,000 weapons, clearly indicate the magnitude of the work that still lies ahead and the fact that the process of disarmament has just begun. Moreover, they highlight the need for a large-scale, efficient, and proactive strategy to collect the largest quantity of weapons in the shortest time possible, and the consolidation of structures with adequate capacity for their collection, storage, and destruction. The success of the UNDP/IOM Programme to date—and in particular the momentum for weapons surrender it has generated among ex-combatants—highlights the viability of an approach combining weapons collection with reintegration in tackling simultaneously the supply of, and demand for, weapons.

Weapons attrition: An important practical consideration for future weapons-collection activities concerns rates of weapons attrition. From the survey data and site visits, the research team noted that the vast majority of small individual holdings—between one and five weapons—are poorly maintained and stored—e.g. buried in sacks. The corresponding high attrition rate suggests that within a few years most of them will be unserviceable. According to weapons distribution patterns recorded by the

research team, these weapons account for approximately 59 per cent of total holdings. If these weapons are subtracted from the global estimate, the remainder is approximately 17,000 serviceable weapons (see Figure 22).



Page 42

The question of militia size: Due to the lack of a formal demobilization process in RoC, there are currently no reliable or complete statistics on the size of the militias. The research team attempted to develop a more accurate understanding by using extrapolations from UNDP/IOM Programme data. These estimates, however, are broadly indicative of all individuals associated with the militias, and as such should be considered a very rough approximation to be used with caution. This raises the broader question of defining and identifying ex-combatants: are they to be considered individuals with military training and long-term involvement in the conflicts, or simply individuals who acquired—and used—a weapon as ‘occasional’ combatants? For research purposes it was decided to adopt a broad approach that encompassed both, but the question clearly remains whether reintegration and weapons collection activities should be targeting a distinct strata or group in society, or an ‘armed society’ more broadly. What clearly emerges from the research findings, however, is that weapons availability is a grave problem in both.

The future. The acquisition and distribution of weapons in Congo illustrates the presence of certain enabling factors in the regional and domestic environments that shaped the nature of the conflicts between 1993 and 1999. From the regional perspective, these consist of extensive international weapons trading networks—brokers, suppliers, cargo companies, and host of financial and logistical intermediaries—whose activities ensure the availability of weapons throughout Central Africa. Weapons procurement was also a feature of regional political alliances between governments that ensured that appropriate channels were placed at the disposition of the belligerents. From the domestic perspective, enabling factors include the lack, or very poor capacity, of mechanisms to control both government weapons depots and the proliferation of weapons internally and across borders. In addition, the tendency of some political actors in Congo to use violence to achieve their ends provides a fertile climate for the creation of para-statal or non-state armed formations. Initiatives such as the

UNDP/IOM Programme are extremely important in mitigating the consequences of conflict, and should be viewed in the context of more comprehensive national and regional strategies to tackle broader enabling factors and prevent further cycles of violence and renewed weapons acquisition and use.

The distribution of weapons

Following the administration of a large-scale survey of weapons holdings among ex-combatants and a series of missions to the regions of Pool, Niari, Bouenza, Lekoumou, and Kouilou, the research team was able to assess broad patterns in the distribution of both ex-combatants and the weapons they possess. Due to a lack of data on the size and distribution of ex-combatants, the tension still prevailing in the interior, and insufficient time to comprehensively cover the country, the research team was not able to visit the northern regions of Congo, or attempt regional breakdowns for both militia size and the quantities of weapons still in circulation. The research team was, however, able to obtain insights into critical aspects of weapons distribution, the difference in this regard between militias, and the security conditions prevailing in the different regions.

Weapons caches. The majority of weapons in Congo are held in small individual holdings rather than large centralized caches. This pattern of distribution and stockpiling presents both openings and obstacles for weapons-collection activities. First, the existence of individual caches suggests that collection efforts can effectively home in on individual ex-combatants at a personal level. Through participatory or survey techniques, the project can identify individual interests and elaborate incentive schemes accordingly. They are not bound, then, to the broader and more sophisticated strategic concerns of groups in control of large amounts of weaponry. At the same time, however, the segmented distribution of small caches throughout the country obstructs their identification and demands considerable logistical capacities for collection. As discovered by the research team, the widespread diffusion of weapons also impedes an effective evaluation or assessment of precise quantities.

Weapons retention rates. Spontaneous and unorganized weapons acquisition and distribution has resulted in markedly uneven patterns of weapons possession in the RoC. Within each of the militias, individual weapons holdings vary widely, from significant numbers of ex-combatants who possess no weapons, to others who possess one weapon, or between two and five, or larger personal caches. In addition, among the Cocoye and Ninja there is evidence of larger collective caches maintained by former unit commanders. In this context, it is difficult to generalize on whether ex-combatants as a whole exhibit a 'high' or 'low' rate of weapons retention. What is clear, however, is that significantly more weapons exist in circulation—and, as a whole, in the possession of individual combatants—than past and current initiatives have targeted. This draws attention to how the weapons 'yield' per person could be increased in future weapons collection activities in order to maximize possibilities for complete disarmament.

Weapons distribution patterns. The different patterns of weapons distribution and ownership among militia groups indicate that they should not necessarily be treated as a homogeneous entity. These differences are a reflection not only of different modes of acquiring and distributing weapons but equally of profound differences with respect to the organization of the militias and the psychological disposition of individual ex-combatants. The high rate of weapons retention among Cobra ex-combatants, for instance, is reflective of both the extreme lack of organizational coherence within the militia and highly individualistic approaches to weapons acquisition by individual ex-combatants. The distribution of Cocoye weapons in small individual to medium-sized collective caches reflects both a moderate degree of internal organization and an individual mind-set that is highly defensive and associated with a collective 'ideology' of resistance. Finally, the distribution of Ninja weapons between large collective caches and small personal holdings indicates a high level of organizational coherence at the

end of the 1998–99 conflict, when the majority of weapons were cached. The internal split in 1998 suggests that this organizational coherence has been maintained among the Ntoumi faction, resulting in a highly group-oriented outlook among its members. This is not the case with the remainder of the Ninja militia, whose members have dispersed and whose outlook is far less militarized. As a result, efforts to collect substantial quantities of weapons require differentiated and well-thought-out strategies that would calibrate weapons collection and incentive schemes with identified differences in weapons distribution and possession between militias.

Conditions for weapons collection. Predictably, the ‘possibilities’ for collecting weapon—the willingness of individuals or groups to surrender weapons—vary markedly between regions and militias. Though Brazzaville enjoys a favourable environment for collecting weapons, the same cannot be said for other regions, in particular Pool, Lekoumou, Niari, and Bouenza. There, the general willingness of ex-combatants to reintegrate into society and surrender their weapons is offset by legitimate preoccupations with security and the continued uneasy relations between government and foreign forces on the one side and ex-combatants on the other. It must be stressed, then, that the success of any weapons collection process is largely dependent on progress in the peace process, particularly the reduction of tensions and perceived insecurities between ex-combatants and government forces in the interior. Building on its success in fostering cooperation between authorities and ex-combatants in Brazzaville, the UNDP/IOM Programme could directly contribute to inducing a favourable climate by facilitating confidence-building measures in the interior. For example, urging the government to scale down its state of military preparedness in particular locations following the collection of large quantities of weapons could constitute one strategy for increasing security and good will for continued demilitarization.

Page 44

Defining ex-combatants. There is considerable ambiguity, both in theory and in practice, over the definition of an ‘ex-combatant’. This is not simply a question of semantics. Observations and interviews with ex-combatants throughout the country reveal a diverse array of perceptions regarding collective and individual identity. These range from hard-core warriors among the Ninjas of the Ntoumi faction—who can hardly be classified as ex-combatants—to a large number of civilians among the Cocoye who have already turned their backs on their previous association and consider themselves ‘psychologically’ reintegrated into society. The range also extends from ‘trained fighters’—such as those from Loudima—involved throughout most of the conflicts, and individuals who were only casually connected with the militias and were given a weapon. In order to ensure the success of reintegration and weapons collection, a strategy is required to accommodate different types of ex-combatants. Ntoumi Ninjas, for instance, may necessitate a conventional reintegration approach, while others, who have already taken steps to reintegrate into society, could be approached from the perspective of an area-based, collective reintegration and weapons collection scheme.

Child combatants. The relevance of a differentiated approach is particularly acute when one considers the question of child combatants. According to the survey carried out in Brazzaville, a significant proportion—some 15 per cent—of ex-combatants are or were below the age of 18 during the last conflict. The trauma of war and the use of a weapon among children has long-term generational implications for society as a whole. These relate to psycho-social and psychological trauma, acute behavioural problems, and related challenges for reintegration.

Small arms proliferation and trade

Research on small arms proliferation and trade revealed that the movement of weapons either internally or across borders is negligible. The surprising lack of trade can be attributed to the fragmented and dispersed nature of weapons distribution throughout the country and the low economic and subjective value ascribed to them by individual ex-combatants. That said, there are indications that the internal trade in weapons, if allowed to continue, could pose serious threats to security in the RoC as a whole.

Cross-border trade. The cross-border trade of weapons into RoC consists primarily of the ‘ant-trade’: individuals and small networks crossing into the country to purchase a few weapons. The fragmented distribution of weapons in RoC, the lack of organization among weapons owners, and the deterring presence of authorities both along the Congo river and in Kinshasa effectively reduce the development of a lucrative weapons market. Despite the location of RoC in an unstable and conflict-prone region, it appears that the bulk of weapons used in Angola and DRC are procured from organized dealers and on a much larger scale. Although the research team found little evidence of small numbers of weapons re-entering RoC, the upcoming launch of Phase III of MONUC could change the dynamics of the weapons trade, depending on how the disarmament component is organized.

Internal redistribution of weapons. Research findings indicate the existence of an embryonic weapons market in the RoC involving not only ex-combatants but also civilians and possibly foreign forces. Its existence in Congo could have a detrimental impact on both reintegration and weapons-collection activities. Although the redistribution of weapons connected to the UNDP/IOM Programme is, for the most part, non-monetary in nature, an increase in the buying and selling of weapons in anticipation of entrance into the project could increase awareness of the value of weapons as economic commodities. This could have a deleterious impact on weapons collection activities in so far as such a market would create artificial supply ceilings on the number of weapons available for collection, and in this manner force the project to adopt a particular ratio for weapons exchanged. Realization of economic opportunities could furthermore increase the reticence of ex-combatants to freely surrender their weapons en masse. These possibilities together amount to a vindication of the UNDP/IOM Programme’s current approach—which ensures that an ‘exchange ratio’ is never established—and draws attention to complementary measures such as refocusing weapons collection activities away from individuals and towards collectivities—groups and communities—hence reinforcing the non-linear link between weapons and reintegration.

The trade in poaching weapons. The trade in military weapons for poaching activities represents two threats to security and stability in RoC. First, the trade is encouraging the development of an illegal market for big game or ‘bush’ meat. The attendant violence, crime, and other consequences of this form of activity threaten both the sustainable livelihoods of inhabitants located near reserves and the local wildlife itself. Second, the trade in poaching weapons is an indicator that weapons owned by ex-combatants are being (re)sold to civilians. This leakage is symptomatic of a trend toward criminality.

Impact of small arms on security conditions

Assessing the impacts of the weapons collection programme is a vital, if under-appreciated, component of any disarmament effort. There are two basic assumptions of any collection effort: first, that the fewer weapons there are in society, the less the chance that someone will be hurt, and the greater the probability that security will improve. Second, it is assumed that when weapons are removed (and destroyed), regardless of their number or quality, they send an important confidence-building message to the community at large. The obvious questions that must be asked, however, are whether the actual physical number of weapons taken out of a society actually matters, and, relatedly, whether human security and human development will improve as a result of weapons being removed.

Preliminary research undertaken on the impacts of small arms in Brazzaville indicate a correlation between the widespread availability of weapons and related threats to human security. In order to facilitate the effectiveness of the weapons collection programme, several impact indicators were identified and refined. These indicators relate to gunshot fatalities and injuries, criminality, and criteria generated from communities themselves through participatory techniques. The effective measurement of these indicators, and their relation to the collection programme, is contingent on a concerted focus on small arms. In other words, the assessment of these indicators must be separated as much as possible from other factors conducive to insecurity such as widespread political instability, job insecurity, and the like. This can be done by contrasting areas where the UNDP/IOM is intervening with areas that are not being supported—effectively controlling for the impacts of a given programme.

Endnotes

1. These figures do not, however, take into account of approximately 6,000 weapons collected by the Congolese government between 1999 and 2000 due to lack of information on which militias surrendered them.
2. UNDP/IOM Programme update report, August 2001.
3. Fernand Nzaba (1999, pp. 65–6) According to him, ‘les milices deviennent pour le pouvoir des espaces de rétention de la jeunesse . . . dans un Etat qui n’offrait plus d’ouverture sur le marché du travail, en même temps qu’elles étaient assignées à des tâches de surveillance de périmètre urbain . . . que les services officiels de défense et de la police nationale n’assumaient plus du fait de leur bureaucratisation” (p. 66).
4. The logic and assumptions behind these adjustments are explained in the section below.
5. Unless otherwise stated, all figures for SALW include firearms ranging from pistols to heavy machine guns (14.5 calibre) and exclude explosives—including grenades and mines—and ammunition.
6. Selection bias took the form of a tendency by survey administrators—who were ex-combatants themselves—to select respondents who were known to possess weapons. Weights were applied in the form of a redistribution-oriented towards smaller individual stockpiles in order to obtain a more accurate picture of weapons distribution.
7. In order to verify the accuracy of the projections of weapons in government holdings and those procured from abroad, further information was gathered from ex-combatants, unit commanders, current and former military officers, and on-site inspections. This information, which is included as a list in Annex 3, yields a ‘soft’ figure of 87,000 weapons obtained by all militias, adjusted for weapons ‘recycled’ between conflicts.
8. For a sample list of weapons depots identified by the research team, see Annex 3.
9. Interview with Commander of the General Staff in Pointe Noire, Pointe Noire, August 2001.
10. On-site inspection of military depot and conversations with officers in Pointe Noire, August 2001.
11. This inference was corroborated by a high-ranking FAC officer (interview in Brazzaville, 11 September 2001). According to him, almost all weapons depots were looted, and the vast majority of weapons ‘disappeared into the forests’, leaving behind a negligible quantity in the hands of remaining government forces.
12. For a detailed list of all identified weapons looted from government depots, see Annex 4.
13. Interview with Cocoye former unit commander, Brazzaville, 17 July 2001.
14. Information on arms procurement by the Ninjas obtained by a former head of logistics for the Ninja militia, in the context of research conducted for this study.
15. Interview with a FAC Officer and former Cobra unit commander, Brazzaville, 26 July 2001, and a high-ranking FAC Colonel and former Information Officer for the Cobras, Brazzaville, 25 August 2001.
16. According to one officer, approximately 150 weapons were stocked in individual houses for their eventual distribution. Approximately half the weapons in these caches were army weapons, while the rest were acquired externally. Interview with FAC officer, Brazzaville, 26 July 2001.
17. Interviews with former Cobra unit commanders, as well as Cobra ex-combatants who were directly involved in the capture of the Talangai military depots, Brazzaville, July 2001.
18. Interviews with Ninja and Cocoye unit commanders and ex-combatants, August 2001.

19. Lissouba agreed to 'host' or 'retain' UNITA weapons from Angola following the signing of the Lusaka Accords in 1994, and progressively 'feed' them back. According to several informants, Lissouba retained a portion of these weapons as a price for their storage. Information received from a former high-ranking Ninja unit commander. This is not dissimilar to arrangements made between UNITA and the current administration of Eyedama in Togo. See also Small Arms Survey (2001, p. 119).
20. Interview with a Ninja unit commander and former Ninja Regional Commissaire for Pool region, 18 July 2001.
21. Interview with former Ninja commander in charge of forces between Kinkala and Brazzaville, and the series of roadblocks at which Cocoye forces were disarmed, Brazzaville, 24 July 2001.
22. Interviews with Cocoye unit commanders and ex-combatants, Brazzaville, Dolisie, and Nkayi, July–August 2001.
23. Information from former Cocoye commander in charge of weapons procurement and logistics, received 23 August 2001; interview with former Cocoye commander and deputy officer in charge of the Loudima training camp, Brazzaville, 26 July 2001. See also *The Jerusalem Post*, 10 October 1994, and *The Saudi Gazette*, 24 February 1994. These weapons were purchased to equip Lissouba's 'Reserve Ministerielle' recruits in Aubeville and Loudima (approximately 1,500 men).
24. Documents seized in Lissouba's residence in 1997 reveal that Rudolph Wollenhaupt, formerly with Pretoria-based 'Ebar Management and Trading', with the assistance of Jacques Monsieur brokered 12 shipments between June and September 1997 totaling USD 61.43 million. According to end-user certificates (EUCs), these shipments included a minimum of 12,000 AK-47 (10,000 with under-barrel grenade launchers), 550 RPG-7s, and 1,000 FM pistols. EUCs for these shipments are reproduced in the Republic of Congo (1999, pp. 763–8). See also *The Observer* (28 November, 1999) and *Liberation* (11 June 2001).
25. Official RSA records indicate that a USD 1.7 million transaction took place between South Africa and the Congolese government in 1997. Assuming an average unit price of USD 300 per Vector R4/R5—an assault rifle based on the Israeli Galil sighted by the research team—an estimated 5,300 (R4/R5) weapons could have been in the shipment. Due to the absence of any indication of the contents of the shipment, these quantities are an approximate order of magnitude of what was likely delivered. By using similar methods, the total quantity of weapons transferred in the 1997 deal—small arms constituted approximately USD 3.2 million out of a deal valued at USD 14 million—is estimated to be 10,600 R4/R5s. See the *Mail and Guardian* (15 August 1997) and Agence France Presse (15 August 1997).
26. Information and evidence provided by a field researcher for the Small Arms Survey. These include interview transcripts with the pilot of the aircraft transporting weapons from China to Harare, Zimbabwe, where they were subsequently transferred to Pointe Noire. Although the precise quantities of weapons received from China are not known, estimates can be derived from the cargo capacity of the aircraft used—Ilyushin 76, with a maximum payload of 46 metric tonnes—and the 2:1 ratio of arms to ammunition flights commonly used in weapons shipments. Adjusting for other items in the cargo—uniforms, supporting equipment, etc.—yields an approximate total of 10,000 weapons. Other unverified reports indicate that weapons were also flown in to Pointe Noire from Slovakia and Turkmenistan.
27. Interview with the commander of the Point Noire General staff, Pointe Noire, 4 August 2001.
28. Interview with a former Cocoye commander, Brazzaville, 25 July 2001; information received from the former Cocoye commander of the Dolisie military sector, 10 August 2001.
29. Interview with the commander of the Point Noire General staff, Pointe Noire, 4 August 2001, and the former Ninja commander and commanding officer of the Makala military camp, Brazzaville, 24 July 2001.

30. During this period the RoC was a major sanctions-busting hub for an estimated 450 metric tonnes of UNITA weapons, which were transported from Bulgaria to UNITA-held territories via then Zaire and Pointe Noire in RoC. See Human Rights Watch (1999), Vines (1999) and United Nations Security Council (2000).
31. Information provided by a former Cobra commander, Brazzaville, 24 August 2001, and a former FAC officer and Cobra unit commander, Brazzaville, 26 July 2001, corroborated by interviews with Cobra ex-combatants, Brazzaville, July 2001. These weapons, Bulgarian-manufactured AKS-47s, are easily distinguishable by their black plastic pistol and barrel grips, and the fact that serial numbers have been effaced from most weapons.
32. Information provided by a former Cobra commander, Brazzaville, 24 August 2001 and a former Cobra unit commander, Brazzaville, 4 July 2001, corroborated by interviews with Cobra ex-combatants, Brazzaville, July 2001. Although no precise figures are available for the number of small arms delivered to pro-Sassou forces, anecdotal estimates of 3,000–6,000 weapons make it clear that large numbers were involved, allowing for a conservative estimate of probable quantities to be made.
33. UNDP/IOM Programme data.
34. The observation that there are approximately three weapons per Cobra ex-combatant is borne out by a list compiled by the UNDP/IOM Programme between May and July 2001 of ex-combatants who have identified weapons they are willing to surrender in exchange for reintegration benefits. This list identifies 1,930 weapons for 514 ex-combatants, or a ratio of 3.8 weapons per ex-combatant.
35. To be precise, 30 per cent are located in villages in Niari, 16 per cent in Lekoumou, and 17 per cent in Bouenza.
36. One Ninja unit commander claimed to have disarmed 20–30 per cent of retreating Cocoye combatants at the Djoué bridge outside Brazzaville. Interview with former Ninja unit commander, Brazzaville, 24 July 2001.
37. Interview with the commander of the Kinkala military zone, Kinkala, 31 July 2001.
38. Interviews with Ninja ex-combatants, Kinkala, 2 August 2001.
39. According to key-informant interviews with Ninja ex-combatants (Brazzaville, 11 September), many ex-combatants were disarmed following 1999 by either the government, Ntoumi, or their own unit commanders. Consequently, many individuals no longer possess weapons, others have managed to retain at least one weapon—for self-defence—while unit commanders and other influential ex-combatants have managed to amass large collective holdings.
40. Group interviews with Ninja ex-combatants in Kinkembo, Kingoyi, and Mayama, July–August 2001.
41. Interview with Ninja unit commander, Mayama, 14 and 15 August 2001.
42. Research report on Cocoye structure, written by a former Cocoye unit commander, 3 August 2001.
43. Anyone going to the front between January and December 1999 became part of the ‘military wing’ of the Cocoye-Ninja alliance. Those who wished to express their (verbal or physical) opposition to the current administration, also called themselves ‘Cocoye’.
44. According to local authorities in Niari, the number of Cocoye swelled from some 2,000 in mid-1998 to almost 10,000–15,000 in Mossendjo and 14,000 in Nyanga, with ‘most young people called to arms’ by early 1999 (interviews with local authorities, Mossendjo and Nyanga, 26–27 July 2001). Regardless of whether these assertions are accurate, they still serve to illustrate the ‘elastic’ and fluid nature of militia membership and the difficulties involved in defining ex-combatants for practical purposes.

45. Group interview of Cocoye ex-combatants in Nyanga, Niari region, 27 July 2001.
46. Interview with the Police Commissioner, Sibiti, 8 August 2001, and the Prefect of Sibiti, 7 August 2001.
47. The Cobra, it will be recalled, obtained many of their weapons in the 1997 conflict in a free-for-all handout following the capture of the military depots in Brazzaville, whereas weapons were distributed Cocoye to militias in a far more organized and coherent manner.
48. For example, photographic evidence of a 'factional cache' in Sibiti, revealed under the condition of anonymity, yielded two G-3s (Iranian or German made), a Chinese SGM (7.62mm), an Israeli Galil (5.56 mm), 1 PM noire, 1 PMAK (7.62mm), two RPG-7s, three rockets, two 'green boxes' (ammunition), flares and grenades (see photo insert).
49. Interview with former mediator in the 1999 peace negotiations; interviews with Cobra ex-combatants, Brazzaville, August 2001.
50. Interview with the Sub-Prefect of Sibiti, Lekoumou Region, 8 August 2001; interviews with Cocoye ex-combatants in Niari region, 26–27 July 2001.
51. One former FAZ soldier interviewed for this study showed the research team two AK-74s he intended to either sell or present to the UNDP/IOM Programme for reintegration benefits (interview with ex-FAZ soldiers, Brazzaville, 12 and 14 July, 2001).
52. Interview with former Cobra unit commanders, Brazzaville, 14 and 26 July 2001.
53. Numerous examples of such trade were cited in discussions with ex-combatants in Brazzaville. These discussions also revealed that this trade transcends divisions between militias; several of the cases heard were of Ninja ex-combatants purchasing weapons from Cobra ex-combatants in the northern districts of Brazzaville.
54. Such redistribution is at its most intense in the northern districts of Brazzaville—notably Talangai and Ouenze—where the majority of Cobra ex-combatant weapons are located.
55. This was particularly evident in sites outside Brazzaville. Interviews with local authorities in Sibiti, Lekoumou region, Pointe Noire, and Nkayi, Bouenza region, August 2001.
56. Interview with the Sub-Prefect of Sibiti, Lekoumou region, 7 August 2001.
57. Interviews with ex-combatants and former unit commanders, Brazzaville, July–August 2001.
58. Conversation with John Poulsen, Projet de la Réserve du Lac Télé, Wildlife Conservation Society, Brazzaville, 16 August 2001.
59. For example, though Yemen is saturated with small arms, the incidence of systematic armed violence is limited. On the other hand, while vigorous efforts have been made to collect weapons in post-conflict societies such as Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, armed violence continues to escalate.
60. The consultants have developed a time-series dataset on all patients treated at the three hospitals between 1998 and 2000. This dataset was established with the essential cooperation and support of Dr. André Mbou at the CHU department for statistics.

Annex 1: Research Matrix		
Research Objectives	Indicators (Quantifiable/measurable)	Methodology
Assess weapons availability, possession, and trade in the Republic of Congo	<p>Overall approach</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unstructured qualitative and context-specific situation assessments • Generic indicator-based analyses • Quantitative model-based analysis (extrapolations on basis of cluster sampling techniques) <p>Target groups:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ninja militia • Cobra militia • Cocoye militia <p>Periodization:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conflict (1993–1999) • Post-conflict (1999–2001) 	<p>Data sources</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extensive interviewing of former and current militia members in Brazzaville and other regions (all ranks) • Key-informant interviews with government officials • Primary source documentation (ROC government, militias) • Reports, collected evidence (weapons), databases, and background papers on militias (UN and other agencies) • Investigative research on arms procurement and pipelines • Visits to militia regions and command structures, on-site inspections • Focus groups with former and current militia members
1.1 Acquisition of SALW (conflict period)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weapons (quantities and types) acquired by militias on international markets. • Sources, intermediaries (brokers, dealers, transport, and financial agents) and pipelines for weapons according to militia (internal and external) • Weapons (quantities and types) stolen, purchased, or captured by militias (internal). • Weapons transferred to militias from foreign forces (governmental and other) in RoC. • Funding sources and modalities for weapons acquired. • Profile of weapons obtained: new production versus surplus, condition, etc.) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Investigative research on arms procurement and transactions (interviews, transport modalities (e.g. air cargo), primary documentation retrieval, ROC 'White Book', investigation of French, South African, and Angolan sources) • Interviews with former and current militia members (all ranks, in Brazzaville and other regions) • Key-informant interviews with militia commanders responsible for arms procurement. • Key-informant interviews with government officials (MoD, Internal Security, Police, Border Guard) • Review of government documents, analyses, and statistics (where available) on weapons procurement and possession by militias. • Inspection and analysis of collected weapons (government and UNDP/IOM) depots and recorded information (serial numbers, models, markings) • Media and other secondary source materials.
1.2 Possession of SALW (conflict period)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Militia SALW stockpiles and caches (quantities and types of weapons) • Location of militia stockpiles and caches • Organisation, management, and control of militia stockpiles and caches • SALW distribution and requisitioning systems for militia stockpiles and caches • SALW stockpiles not in control of militias • Weapons carried (or possessed) by militia members 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Key-informant interviews with militia officers (unit commanders, officers in charge of stockpile security, etc.) • Interviewing of militia members (sampled by militia, unit, and deployment area) • Review of militia stockpile inventory lists (if obtainable) and other documents on stocks and weapons distribution mechanisms. • On-site inspection of militia weapons caches and other stockpiles (Brazzaville and other regions) • Review of government documents/analyses on militia stocks (if available) from MoD, internal security, Comite de Suivi • Review of UNHCR/IOM/UNDP/WFP situation reports on military activity/organization outside Brazzaville • Media and other secondary source materials
1.3 SALW availability and trade in the post-conflict period	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weapons retained by militias • Weapons in the possession of demobilised former militia members • Weapons sold or abandoned by, or stolen from, militias • Weapons transfers to militias in the post-conflict period • Current status of militia stockpiles and caches (location and management) • Weapons held by or transferred to non-militia and non-army elements (criminal groups, etc.) • Weapons held by civilian population • Weapons transfers within RoC • Weapons transfers into RoC from neighbouring countries • Weapons transfers from foreign groups in RoC (armed forces, other organisations) • Structure of the weapons market in RoC (location, prices, types, quantities, sellers, intermediaries, suppliers and sources) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review of government disarmament programme, including stockpile security and destruction (analysis of documents, statistics, key-informant interviews, and verification of 18,000 figure) • Access to government storage depots for collected weaponry • Interviews with former and current militia members (all ranks), clustered sampling • Analysis of weapons retrieved to date by UNDP/IOM project and consultations with project staff • Key-informant interviews with National Army procurement officers, police and border authorities, and other agencies as necessary • Review of agency (UNDP/UNHCR/UNICEF/WFP) sitreps and consultations in the field • On-site inspection and information gathering on weapons market activity • Investigative research on arms flows between ROC and neighbouring countries (DRC, Angola, etc.) • Media and official crime reports on incidents involving military weapons

Annex 2: Survey Questionnaire Administered to Ex-Combatants

Questionnaire on the Possession of Weapons by Ex-Combatants

The following is a questionnaire administered by the UNDP/IOM Programme for the reintegration of ex-combatants. All responses are confidential.

Name: _____

Age: _____

Telephone number: _____

Address (quarter) : _____

Province: _____

Place of origin (if different from address above): _____

Questionnaire administered by: _____

Page 52

FIRST PART

A. How many and what types of weapons did you possess following the conflict of December 1999, but before the cessation of hostilities?

Types	Quantity
PMAK (AK-47)	
RPG	
SKS Rifle	
PM Castor (PMAK)	
Grenades	
Ammunition	
Other	

B. In what condition were these weapons in 1999?

New	
Average condition	
Non-serviceable	

SECOND PART

A. How many and what types of weapons do you currently possess?

Types	Quantity
PMAK (AK-47)	
RPG	
SKS Rifle	
PM Castor (PMAK)	
Grenades	
Ammunition	
Other	

B. In what condition are these weapons today?

New	
Average condition	
Non-serviceable	

THIRD PART

A. If you possess fewer weapons today than in 1999, what explains the difference?

1. They were discarded	
2. They were hidden	
3. They were sold (to whom?)	
4. They were collected (by whom?)	

B. Are your weapons hidden in one or several locations?

1. One location only	
2. Two locations	
3. Three locations	
4. Four or more locations	

C. Where are your weapons (town, quarter and province)?

Town, quarter and province	Number of weapons in each cache

D. Where are the majority of your weapons (mark one response only)?

1. At home	
2. In another location in Brazzaville	
3. In your home village	
4. In another location (indicate precisely)	

Annex 3: Partial List of Government Weapons Depots

Region	City	Number	Type	Name
Niari	Dolisie	3	MB	
			AMD	
			TC	
Bouenza	Loudima	1	TC	
	Nkayi	2	MB	
			TC	
	Loutete	1	TC	
	Aubeville	1	TC	
Madingou	1	AMD		
Lekoumou	Sibiti	1	MB	
Kouilou	Pointe Noire	4	MB	Base Aeriene No. 2
			MB	Etat Major
			AMD	Poudriere
			AMD	
Plateau	Gamboma	1	TC	Academie Militaire
Cuvette	Ouessou	1	MB	
Sangha	Owando	1	MB	
Likouala	Impfondo	1	MB	
Pool	BZV	12	MB	Regiment Blindé
			MB	L'Intendance
			MB	Génie Civile
			MB	Marine Nationale
			TC	Ecole de Police
			AMD	Materielle
			AMD	DCAM
			MB	Base Aeriene No. 1
			MB	Camp 15 août
	AMD	Caserne Gendarmerie		
MB	Komakala			
	Kintele	1	TC	Academie Militaire

Page 54

MB Military base
 TC Training camp
 AMD Arms and munitions depot

Annex 4: Weapons Acquired by Militias, 1993–1999						
Militia	Date	City	Depot	Method of acq.	Est. wpns acquired	Totals
Cobra	end-1994	Gamboma	Académie Militaire	Looting	800 (400 to ninja)	400
	1997	Brazzaville	PM Noires from Angola	Purchase	5,000	5,000
	1997	Brazzaville	Disarming of Depot Defenders	Ambush	600	8,800
			Regiment Blindé	Looting	3,500	
			L'Intendance			
			Matériel			
			DCAM		4,500 ?	
			Génie Civile			
			Marine Nationale			
	Raids on PSPs Talangai, Ouenza,	Looting	200			
1997	Brazzaville	Moungali, Poto Poto			10,000?	
Ninja	1993–994	BZV + POOL	Transfers from Angola and Gabon	Free distribution	10,000?	1,589
			Ambush of soldiers (BZV)	Ambush	346	
			Camp Makala	Theft	50	
			Raids on PSP/FAC Pool region	Looting	773	
			Acquired from COBRA	Distribution	400	
			Purchased from Kinshasa	Purchase	20	
	August 1997	Brazzaville	Camp Makala	Looting	2,000	22,830
			Camp 15 août	Distribution	6,000	
			Gendarmerie Centrale	Distribution	3,500	
			Base Aérienne 01	Distribution	210	
			Commissariat Central de la Police	Distribution	200	
			DST	Distribution	200	
			Directorat Général de la Police	Distribution	220	
			PSP Plateau des 15 ans	Looting	50	
			Lissouba HQ (Presidency)	Distribution	4,700	
			Pointe Noire train	Distribution	5,700	
	Retreating ex-FAZ	Ambush	50			
	1998–1999	Pool	Captured weapons	Looting	6,670	6,670
			Raids on PSPs Pool	Looting		
			Raids on military installations	Looting		
			Looting of Academie Kintele	Looting		
	Cocoye	1993–1994		Armed forces reserves	Distribution	1,000
Israeli weapons				Purchase	2,000	
1997			South African purchases	Purchases	15,000	28,000
			UNITA Weapons	Theft	3,000	
			Chinese purchases		10,000	
			SA transshipments			
1998–1999			Raids on PSPs, military camps		6,000	6,000
			Raid on Loudima training camp			
			Raid on Reserve Présidentielle,			
			Kola (Niari)			
Total						92,289
Adjusted (6% recycling)						86,752

Annex 5: Weapons Collected by the CDS, 2000

Comité de Suivi weapons collection, 2000 - Consolidated results*								
Type	BZV & N.C.	Kouilou	Bouenza	Niari	Lekoumou	Pool	North	Total
All calibres (unidentified)							710	710
PMAK	3,531	166	384	633	282	1,559	177	6,732
SKS	7	12	22	66	48	1	6	162
Pistols	1	8	13	2	-	20	3	47
RPG	-	11	5	9	3	7	4	39
FM	5	-	4	8	3	-	-	20
MG	2	8	12	6	5	6	4	
(SGM, RPD, RPK)								43
HMG (12,7, 14,5)	-	2	2	5	5	3	-	17
GALIL	-	-	23	19	6	-	11	59
Hunting rifles	1	6	40	3	1	-	1	52
SCHMEL	-	1	-	1	-	5	-	7
Mortar 82mm	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	3
Mortar 60mm	-	1	1	2	-	-	-	4
Castor	-	5	-	1	-	2	-	8
PAL-MASS	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
PPCHA	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
K-44	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
B-10	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2
CSR 75mm	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
TLG	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
AT Mine	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
AP Mine	-	-	12	36	-	-	-	48
Totals	3,547	221	518	800	354	1,603	916	7,249

Page 56

* The Comité de Suivi also reported that an additional 6,500 weapons were bought back by the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of the Interior

Source: Government of the Republic of Congo (2000)

Annex 6: Projections from Militia Size Estimates and Weapon Distribution

Estimated quantities of weapons possessed on basis of militia									
	Lower threshold (IOM estimates)			Upper threshold (adjusted)			Average militia size		
	Militia size	Adj for no wpns	Weapons	Militia size	Adj for no wpns	Weapons	Militia size	Adj for no wpns	Weapons
Cobra	11,000	8,800	21,614	15,400	12,320	30,259	13,200	10,560	25,937
Ninja	6,000	4,800	11,023	8,400	6,720	15,432	7,200	5,760	13,228
Cocoye	9,000	7,200	24,866	12,600	10,080	34,813	10,800	8,640	29,840
Total	26,000	20,800	57,503	36,400	29,120	80,504	31,200	24,960	69,004
Adjustment for wpns destroyed (20%) :			46,002			64,403			55,203
Adjustment for wpns collected (16,000) :			30,002			48,403			39,203

Breakdown of militia weapons holdings by cache size and respective overall quantities possessed									
COBRA			Lower threshold		Upper threshold		Average		
Cache size	% of total wpns	Ratio of wpns to men	No. of combatants/ cache size	Total wpns/ cache size	No. of combatants/ cache size	Total wpns/ cache size	No. of combatants/ cache size	Total wpns/ cache size	
1	43	1.0	3,784	3,784	5,298	5,298	4,541	4,541	
2-5	52	3.1	4,576	13,986	6,406	19,580	5,491	16,783	
6-10	4	7.4	352	2,599	493	3,639	422	3,119	
11+	1	14.1	88	1,245	123	1,742	106	1,493	
		Totals	8,800	21,614	12,320	30,259	10,560	25,937	

Breakdown of militia weapons holdings by cache size and respective overall quantities possessed									
COCOYE			Lower threshold		Upper threshold		Average		
Cache size	% of total wpns	Ratio of wpns to men	No. of combatants/ cache size	Total wpns/ cache size	No. of combatants/ cache size	Total wpns/ cache size	No. of combatants/ cache size	Total wpns/ cache size	
1	45	1.0	3,240	3,240	4,536	4,536	3,888	3,888	
2-5	35	3.5	2,520	8,863	3,528	12,409	3,024	10,636	
6-10	15	7.2	1,080	7,800	1,512	10,920	1,296	9,360	
11+	5	13.8	360	4,963	504	6,948	432	5,955	
		Totals	7,200	24,866	10,080	34,813	8,640	29,840	

Breakdown of militia weapons holdings by cache size and respective overall quantities possessed									
NINJA			Lower threshold		Upper threshold		Average		
Cache size	% of total wpns	Ratio of wpns to men	No. of combatants/ cache size	Total wpns/ cache size	No. of combatants/ cache size	Total wpns/ cache size	No. of combatants/ cache size	Total wpns/ cache size	
1	55	1.0	2,640	2,640	3,696	3,696	3,168	3,168	
2-5	10	2.8	480	1,327	672	1,858	576	1,592	
6-10	5	6.0	240	1,440	336	2,016	288	1,728	
11+	30	3.9	1,440	5,616	2,016	7,862	1,728	6,739	
		Totals	4,800	11,023	6,720	15,432	5,760	13,228	

Annex 7: Distribution of Weapons According to the Survey

Cobra distribution					
Cache size group	Number of owners	% of sampled	Number of weapons per cache group	% of total weapons identified	Ratio of weapons to individuals
1	27	23	27	6	1
2-5	71	60	217	49	3.1
6-10	13	11	96	22	7.4
11+	7	6	99	23	14.1
Totals	118	110	439	100	3.7
Cocoye distribution					
Cache size group	Number of owners	% of sampled	Number of weapons per cache group	% of total weapons identified	Ratio of weapons to individuals
0	2	23	0	0	0
1	9	60	9	2	1
2-5	29	11	102	28	3.5
6-10	9	14	65	18	7.2
11+	14	22	193	52	13.8
Totals	63	100	369	100	5.9
Ninja distribution					
Cache size group	Number of owners	% of sampled	Number of weapons per cache group	% of total weapons identified	Ratio of weapons to individuals
1	40	68	40	40	1
2-5	17	29	47	47	2.8
6-10	2	3	12	12	6
11+	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	59	100	99	100	1.7

Annex 8: Ninja Caches in Pool Region									
District	Village/ location	Size	No. owners	Ratio	Origin	No. still alive	Condition	Wpn types	Contact
Kinkala	Louingo	130	60	2.2	Louingo, other villages	-	Buried in sacks	PMAK, 12-gauge, RPG	-
Kinkala	Kisengene	280	30	9.3	1 écurie, members from surrounding villages	-	Buried in sacks	PMAK, SKS, 12- gauge, RPG, at least 30 grenades.	-
Kinkala	Zouloukabé	150	20	7.5	Kinkala, surrounding villages	-	Buried in sacks	PMAK	Bifoulou Albert
Kinkala	Youngouta	190	90	2.1	Kinkala town	45	Buried in sacks	PMAK	Mahoungou Serafain
Kinkala	Nzagoula	300	60	5.0	Villages of Boko, Mindouli, Kindamba, etc.	-	Buried in sacks	PMAK	Nkouikoulou Exode (brother of 2 commanders who are in Gabon)
Kinkala	Toungadiakou, towards Kindamba	100	30	3.3	Kindamba, Kinkala	22	Buried in sacks	PMAK	Masamba-Aimé Blanchan
Kinkala	Louingo	178	80	2.2	Kinkala	62	Buried in sacks	PMAK, FM, grenades, pistols	-
Mindouli	Yongi	85	20	4.3	-	-	-	RPG, PMAK	-
Mindouli	In the hills, 12km from Mindouli	150	40	3.,8	Cached on order of chief	-	Buried in cases	PMAK, RPG	-
Mindouli	Kilemé, near Kindamba	40	40	1.0	-	-	-	-	-
Mindouli	Mindouli	400	50	8.0	-	20	Hidden in barrels, in uninhabited house	PMAK, Vector R4/R5, RPG, grenades, RPD, FM, 12,7 GMG, ammo	-
Mindouli	Mindouli	145	40	3.6	-	20	Hidden in house	PMAK	Diantele Lambert
Mindouli	Mindouli	160	30	5.3	-	25	Buried under Protestant Church	PMAK, 12,7 GMG	Loufoua Aimé

Annex 9: Sighted Weapons, Republic of Congo, July–August 2001



RPG-7 (Russian manufacture)



SGM (Russian and Chinese manufacture)



Vector R4/R5 (South African Manufacture)



RPD 7.62mm (Russian manufacture)



RPK 7.62mm (Russian manufacture)



Galil 5.46mm (Israeli manufacture)



AK-47 (Russian manufacture)
and Chinese Equivalent (Type 56)



AK-47 (Russian manufacture)
and Chinese Equivalent (Type 56)



AKM 7.62mm (Russian
and Romanian manufacture)




AKMS 7.62mm (Russian manufacture)



RPO-A 'Shmel' 92mm
(Russian manufacture)

Page 62



Bibliography

- Agence France Press. 1999. 'Congolese Troops Fight With South African Materiel.' 15 August.
- Amnesty International. 1999. 'Republic of Congo: An Old Generation of Leaders in New Carnage.' Amnesty International Report. AFR 22/01/99.
- Barnett, Antony. 1999. 'Barclays Held Cash for Massacre.' *The Observer*. 28 November.
- Bazenguissa-Ganga, Rémy. 1996. *Milices Politiques et Bandes Armées à Brazzaville: Enquête sur la Violence Politique et Sociale des Jeunes Déclassés*. Les Etudes du CERI No. 13. Paris : Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques.
- Human Rights Watch. 1999. 'Bulgaria: Money Talks—Arms Dealing with Human Rights Abusers'. *Human Rights Watch Report*, Vol. 11, No. 4. April. <<http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/bulgaria/>>
- . 2000. *Backgrounder on Russian Fuel Air Explosives*. February. <<http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/02/chech0215b.htm>>
- International Organization of Migration and United Nations Development Program (UNDP/IOM). 2001. *Final Consultant's Report: Technical Advisor on Small Arms*. Brazzaville: UNDP/IOM Programme on the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants and Weapons Collection.
- . 2001. *Project Update Report*. Brazzaville. August.
- Kennedy, Tim. 1994. 'Israeli legislators seek to halt export of arms, mercenaries to Congo.' *The Saudi Gazette*. 24 February.
- Makovsky, David and Batsheva Tsur. 1994. 'Congo wants oil-for-arms exchange'. *The Jerusalem Post*. 10 October.
- Nzaba, Fernand. 1999. 'Autonomisation des Milices et Montée de la Criminalité'. In *Congo-Brazzaville: Dérivés Politiques, Catastrophe Humanitaire, Désirs de Paix*. Rupture-Solidarité No. 1. Paris: Editions Karthala, pp. 63–75.
- Pech, Khareen. 1997. 'South Africa Sold Arms to War-Torn Congo.' *Mail and Guardian*. 15 August.
- Pourtier, Roland. 1998. '1997: Les Raisons d'une Guerre 'Incivile.' *Afrique Contemporain*. No. 186, pp. 7–32.
- Republic of Congo. 1999. *The Civil Wars of Congo-Brazzaville: Documents of History*. Two Volumes (November 1993–January 1994, 5 June–15 October 1997). Brazzaville: Government of the Republic of Congo.
- Republic of Congo. 2000. *Final Activity Report*. Comité de Suivi des Accords de Cessez-le-feu et de Cessation des Hostilities en Republique du Congo. Brazzaville. December.
- Small Arms Survey. 2001. *Small Arms Survey 2001: Profiling the Problem*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tassel, Fabrice. 2001. 'Dans le Secret des Trafics de Monsieur.' *Liberation*. 11 June.
- United Nations. 1997. *Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms*. A/54/258 of 27 August.
- United Nations Security Council. 2000. *Report of the Panel of Experts established by the Security Council pursuant to Resolution 1237, on violations of Security Council Resolutions against UNITA*, S/2000/203 of 10 March.
- Vines, Alex. 1999. *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process*. New York: Human Rights Watch.


Small Arms Survey

Graduate Institute of International Studies

1st floor
12 Avenue de Sécheron
1202 Geneva
Switzerland

Phone: +41 22 908 57 77
Fax: +41 22 732 27 38

Email: smallarm@hei.unige.ch
Web site: www.smallarmssurvey.org



A project of the Graduate Institute
of International Studies, Geneva